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SUMMARY 
Over the past decades, co-management of natural resources has been on the political 
reform agenda of many developing countries. However, the empirical knowledge on the 
success factors of co-management and its social-economic impact remains limited. This 
thesis contributes to the understanding of politics and processes of co-management 
using data from the Chinese land cooperative program. The aim of the land cooperative 
program is to consolidate agricultural land by encouraging individual households to 
transfer land to land cooperatives and then to collectively manage the land. In my 
dissertation, I analyze household and village level data from two cities, Suzhou and 
Yangzhou, in Jiangsu Province, China. At the core of this thesis is the question how 
local context and household’ characteristics interact with the implementation of the land 
cooperative program. 
I address this question in three empirical papers. In paper one, I explore the impact of 
different local context variables on the relative amount of land managed by land 
cooperatives across villages. Special attention is paid to the effect of local elites when 
they are cooperative leaders. It is shown that local context successfully explains the 
variation in the proportion of land dedicated to land cooperatives at the village level. In 
particular, when cooperative leaders are local elites, such as government officials, 
village cadres, or are more educated, the proportion of land transferred to the 
cooperative is found to be larger. 
In paper two, I investigate the determinants of households’ cooperative membership and 
its implication on labor allocation. Do different households decide differently on 
cooperative membership? Are member households more likely to have off-farm 
employment? Household heads’ off-farm experience and land endowments generally 
increase the propensity of households to become member in the cooperative. We do not 
find a general effect of cooperative membership on household heads’ current off-farm 
employment, although there is a large effect for households which had more agricultural 
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labor before cooperative initiation. 
In paper three, I analyze how cooperative members participate in decision-making 
processes. In addition, we analyze the relationship between participation in 
decision-making and households’ income derived from cooperative membership. It is 
shown that cooperative members’ engagement in decision-making processes differs 
along their characteristics. In particular, wealthier members and those with communist 
party membership are more likely to participate in decision-making processes. This 
generally confirms earlier findings from case studies that local elites often dominate the 
decision-making process in co-management programs. More importantly, the paper 
finds that cooperative members benefit less if they are not engaged in decision-making 
processes, indicating a lack of equitable representation in the governance of land 
cooperatives. 
The thesis in general shows that local contexts matters to the implementation of the land 
cooperative program. To encourage participation, policy-makers should be aware of the 
heterogeneity of the local population and more accurately take into account the specific 
local context and households’ characteristics. The role of local elites should be 
acknowledged in the design of the next generation of land cooperatives. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
In den letzten Jahrzehnten steht zunehmend das Ko-Management natürlicher 
Ressourcen auf der Reformagenda vieler Entwicklungsländer. Das empirische Wissen 
über Erfolgsfaktoren des Ko-Managements und seine sozial-ökologischen 
Konsequenzen ist jedoch begrenzt. Diese Doktorarbeit trägt durch eine Analyse der 
chinesischen Landgenossenschaften zum Verständnis von Politik und Prozessen im 
Ko-Management bei. Das Ziel der chinesischen Landgenossenschaften ist es, 
landwirtschaftliche Flächen zu konsolidieren, indem Haushalte dazu angeregt werden, 
ihre Flächen an die Genossenschaft zu übertragen und dann das Land gemeinschaftlich 
zu verwalten. In meiner Dissertation analysiere ich Haushaltsdaten und Beobachtungen 
auf der Dorfebene aus einer Zufallsstichprobe in zwei Stadtkreisen, Suzhou und 
Yangzhou, in der Jiangsu Provinz in China. Im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit steht die Frage 
wie der lokale Kontext und Haushaltscharakteristika mit der Implementierung von 
Landgenossenschaften interagieren. 
Ich adressiere diese Frage in drei empirischen Forschungsartikeln. Im ersten Artikel 
untersuchen die Koautoren und ich die Wirkung verschiedener lokaler Kontextvariablen 
in verschiedenen Dörfern auf den Anteil der Landflächen, der von einer 
Landgenossenschaft verwaltet wird. Der Fokus liegt insbesondere auf dem Effekt 
lokaler Eliten, wenn sie als Genossenschaftsvorsitzende fungieren. Es wird gezeigt, dass 
lokale Kontextvariablen die Varianz zwischen Dörfern in Hinblick auf den Anteil an 
Landflächen, die an die Landgenossenschaft übertragen werden, erklären können. 
Insbesondere wenn lokale Eliten, wie Regierungsbeamte, Dorfkader oder gebildete 
Menschen, Genossenschaftsvorsitzende sind, ist der Anteil von Land, der an die 
Genossenschaft übertragen wird, deutlich größer. 
Im zweiten Artikel wenden die Koautoren und ich uns der Haushaltsebene zu und 
untersuchen Bestimmungsfaktoren der Mitgliedschaft in einer Genossenschaft und die 
Auswirkungen der Mitgliedschaft auf die Allokation der verfügbaren Arbeitskraft. 
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Entscheiden verschiedene Haushalte auf verschiedene Weise über eine Mitgliedschaft in 
der Genossenschaft? Sind Haushalte, die Genossenschaftsmitglieder sind, eher in 
außerlandwirtschaftlichen Bereichen berufstätig? Wir stellen fest, dass vorherige 
Erfahrungen des Haushaltsvorstandes mit außerlandwirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten und 
größerer Landbesitz die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Mitgliedschaft in einer 
Landgenossenschaft erhöhen. Außerdem zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass für Haushalte, die 
vor dem Programstart unterschiedlich viel  landwirtschaftliche Arbeitskraft 
aufgebracht haben, andere Bestimmungsfaktoren für die Mitgliedschaft in der 
Genossenschaft ausschlaggebend sind. Wir stellen keinen allgemeinen Effekt von 
Genossenschaftsmitgliedschaft auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit der 
außerlandwirtschaftlichen Berufstätigkeit des Haushaltsvorstandes fest. Gleichwohl ist 
ein starker Effekt für Haushalte zu beobachten, die vor der Gründung der 
Genossenschaft mehr landwirtschaftliche Arbeitskraft aufgebracht haben. 
Im dritten Artikel analysieren die Koautoren und ich, wie stark 
Genossenschaftsmitglieder an Entscheidungsprozessen in der Genossenschaft teilhaben. 
Zusätzlich analysieren wir den Zusammenhang zwischen Partizipation in 
Entscheidungsprozessen und Haushaltseinkommen aus Genossenschaftsmitglied- schaft. 
Wir zeigen, dass das Engagement von Genossenschaftsmitgliedern in 
Entscheidungsprozessen von ihren Eigenschaften abhängt. Insbesondere wohlhabendere 
Mitglieder und solche mit Mitgliedschaft in der kommunistischen Partei haben eine 
höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit an Entscheidungsprozessen teilzunehmen. Diese Ergebnisse 
bestätigen frühere Forschungsergebnisse aus Fallstudien, die besagen, dass lokale Eliten 
oft Entscheidungsprozesse in Ko-Management Programmen dominieren. Darüber 
hinaus zeigt der Artikel, dass Genossenschaftsmitglieder weniger von ihrer 
Mitgliedschaft profitieren, wenn sie nicht in Entscheidungsprozesse involviert sind. 
Dies deutet auf einen Mangel an gleichberechtigter Repräsentation in der Führung der 
Landgenossenschaften hin.  
Zusammenfassend zeigt diese Dissertation, dass der lokale Kontext einen Unterschied 
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in der Implementierung von Landgenossenschaften macht. Um die Mitgliedschaft in 
Genossenschaften zu fördern sollten politische Entscheidungsträger die Heterogenität 
der lokalen Bevölkerung, ebenso wie die spezifischen lokalen Bedingungen und die 
Haushaltscharakteristika genau berücksichtigen. Insbesondere die Rolle lokaler Eliten 
sollte bei der Gestaltung der nächsten Generation von Landgenossenschaften beachtet 
werden. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 Land Institutions and Land Use in China 
The governance of agricultural land in China has undergone several reforms. Before 
1978, agricultural land was owned and controlled by the state or collective authorities. 
The authorities organized agricultural production following a planning approach, which 
was criticized as inefficient (Lin, 1992; Deininger and Jin, 2003). Since the late 1970s, 
China has made significant progress in the devolution of collective land to ownership 
similar to private property in the form of the household responsibility system. Under the 
household responsibility system, land remains collective property. Yet, households can 
cultivate the land they receive and retain revenues, as long as land tax and grain quota 
obligation are fulfilled. 
Despite the remarkable success of land reform in improving households’ access to land 
(Lin, 1992), land fragmentation has emerged as a side-effect and undermined rural 
development in the long run (Tan et al., 2006). Land fragmentation refers to the state of 
small and separated land ownership (King and Burton, 1982). It arises when state-owned 
or collective land is distributed following the egalitarian principle in the devolution 
process or redistributed repeatedly according to population change and family splitting 
(Dijk, 2003; Tan et al., 2006). For example, land distribution under the household 
responsibility system, according to the Document No.1 issued in 1982 by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, was on the basis of household size and 
dependency ratio. Land redistribution occurs every five years or on the request of 
villagers. This resulted in a great level of land fragmentation, with an average household 
landholding of 0.53 ha separated into 6.03 plots in 1999 (Tan et al., 2006). 
Compared to large-scale farming, fragmented land often encounters higher costs of 
machinery use and coordination of infrastructure construction (Niroula and Thapa, 2005). 
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Capital investment in fragmented land, as a consequence, is often insufficient (Dijk, 
2003), leading to a loss of efficiency and competitiveness in agricultural production. 
Subsistence production prevails and commercial production becomes difficult. Moreover, 
labor input on fragmented land is relatively high, slowing down the progress of labor 
migration from the farm sector to the off-farm sector. Law which restricts land lying idle 
adds to the problem. To address the issue of land fragmentation, land rental markets have 
been encouraged. 
Land rental markets could allow households with a comparative advantage in 
agricultural production to gain access to additional land, to increase their farm sizes and 
thus family incomes (Deininger and Jin, 2005). Households who rent out land could 
also benefit by moving to the off-farm sector. Despite of these potential benefits, land 
rental markets in China remained inefficient (Jin and Deininger, 2009). Until 2006, only 
9.93% of the agricultural land had been transferred in Jiangsu Province, one of the most 
economically developed areas in China. The national average in the same year is even 
lower (Ito et al., 2016). A major obstacle to the development of land rental markets in 
China are the high transaction costs resulting from tenure insecurity (Bao et al., 2015).  
Although administrative land reallocations have been officially banned, they are still 
commonly practiced (Deininger et al., 2014; Yan et al., 2014). This practice increases the 
risk of land expropriation for households which transfer land, because the administration 
thinks that households do not need it any more (Deininger et al., 2014). A lack of formal 
land titling or poorly defined property rights add to the problem. Land titling programs 
can ensure enforceable long-term contracts (Deininger et al., 2014). Without land titling, 
land transfers often occur on a short-term basis between kin relatives (Jin and Deininger, 
2009; Gao et al., 2012). Due to highly fragmented land, transaction costs are particularly 
high when land users aim to develop large-scale farming, because they have to identify 
and negotiate with many households. Agency organizations, such as land cooperatives 
recently emerged in China to promote land markets to reduce land fragmentation (Bao et 
al., 2015). 
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1.1.2 The Land Cooperative Program 
The land cooperative program is now viewed by the central government as the main 
organizational form of the collective agricultural economy in rural China (Chen, 2015). 
Figure 1.1 shows a simple introduction of the land cooperative program. Within the land 
cooperative program framework, each village may establish a land cooperative to 
receive land from households who want to quit farming and search for off-farm 
employment opportunities (Tian and Zhu, 2013; Ito et al., 2016). Often, after some basic 
infrastructure construction, land cooperatives then utilize the received land for 
commercial farming. They can either hire employees to farm the land or lease the land 
to farmers – either from or beyond the community – who would like to extend their 
farm (Ito et al., 2016). The land cooperative program is expected by the authorities to 
contribute to scale farming and labor migration from agriculture to other sectors. 
 
Figure 1.1 A Simple Illustration of the Land Cooperative Program 
 
Households who transfer land to cooperatives become cooperative members and receive 
benefits from cooperatives which manage the land. Typically, cooperative members 
benefit in two forms: a fixed income and dividends from the shares (stocks) they own in 
the cooperative (Chen, 2015). The fixed income component is similar to a rent for the 
land a household has transferred to the program. It is independent from the 
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cooperative’s profits. The dividend component, in contrast, is based on the cooperative’s 
profit and the shares a household owns. Typically, one mu1 of land is exchanged for 
one share in the cooperative. Besides the land area, the total amount of shares a 
household owns also depends on factors such as household size or labor availability 
(Yep, 2015). As a result, the land income per unit of land every household receives may 
differ in the same cooperative program due to differences in household characteristics.  
These shares that members receive can be mortgaged, transferred, and inherited, which 
avoids periodical land reallocation and also ensures tenure security (Po, 2008; Ito et al., 
2016). Since land cooperatives become the major transaction partners for land users 
who want to enlarge their farms and households who want to transfer land out, 
transaction costs, especially the costs of searching transaction partners, are saved (Bao et 
al., 2015). A land market has therefore quickly developed after the implementation of 
the land cooperative program. In 2012, approximately 45% of all agricultural land in 
Jiangsu Province has been transacted in such rental markets (Ito et al., 2016). 
As other cooperative organizations, land cooperatives embrace participatory and 
democratic principles. According to the Regulations of Jiangsu Province on Specialized 
Farmers’ Cooperatives (2009) which officially legitimatized the land cooperatives, 
households may voluntarily decide whether to transfer land to the land cooperative 
program. Households, as the members of land cooperatives, have the right to participate 
in major decision-making processes in the organizations, such as devising or revising 
cooperative regulations, voting for cooperative leadership and receiving cooperative 
financial information such as investment and income flows. In other words, the land 
cooperative program establishes co-management governance on land use. 
Despite the rapid rise of the number of land cooperatives in rural China, the program 
                                                 
1 Mu is an unit of area in China. 15 mu equals to one hectare. 
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remains underdeveloped in some areas, and the impacts of the program are still 
unknown. Studies on the land cooperative program are mostly rudimentary (Qian and 
Qu, 2006; Ji and Qian, 2010; Tian and Zhu, 2013; Chen, 2015; Yep, 2015). Except for a 
few studies (Zhang, 2008; Ito et al., 2016), rigorous empirical evidence on the 
determinants and effect of the land cooperative program remains limited. 
1.2 Research Objective and Data 
The overall aim of the thesis is to improve the understanding of the success factors of 
land cooperatives and their impacts on households. In line with the policy intentions of 
the land cooperative program, the thesis focuses on three aspects of land cooperatives: 
the relative amount of land dedicated to land cooperatives in villages, households’ 
cooperative membership and households’ engagement in decision-making. 
One intention of the land cooperative program is to consolidate fragmented agricultural 
land. Although land cooperatives have been established in many villages, the relative 
amount of land dedicated to land cooperatives varies across villages. However, the 
economic logic behind this variation remains poorly understood in the literature. As for 
policy makers, no sufficient evidence exists to suggest which types of villages are more 
likely to succeed in implementing the program. Thus, an analysis of the village and 
household level determinants of the variation may improve our understanding and 
provide important implications for policy makers.  
The second intention of the land cooperative program is to promote labor migration 
from the farm sector to the off-farm sector by encouraging household membership in 
land cooperatives. An evaluation of the program’s effectiveness could serve as a basis 
for further policy making. Moreover, research on how households respond to this 
program in terms of cooperative membership (land transfer) and what household 
characteristics determine their responses leads us to the micro level, complementing our 
understanding of the variation of the relative amount of land dedicated to land 
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cooperatives across villages. 
The third intention of the land cooperative program is to establish a participatory 
governance structure on land resources. However, many cooperative members in reality 
do not participate in decision-making processes (Chen, 2015), and there is no analysis in 
the literature on which types of cooperative members are more likely to participate in 
decision-making. The economic consequences of the variation in participation in 
decision-making are also unknown. Filling these gaps could provide insights to both a 
wider range of research on resource co-management and policy makers in the land 
cooperative context. 
The thesis consists of three empirical essays, and each of them addresses one of the 
three specific research objectives corresponding to the three intentions of land 
cooperatives. 
1. The first objective of the thesis is to identify the determinants of the relative 
amount of land dedicated to land cooperatives across villages (Paper one). 
2. The second objective of the thesis is to identify the determinants of households’ 
membership decisions and their impact on household members’ off-farm 
employment decisions (Paper two). 
3. The third objective of the thesis is to identify the determinants of cooperative 
members’ participation in decision-making and its impact on their access to 
cooperative benefits (Paper three). 
The research site is located in two cities – Suzhou and Yangzhou – in Jiangsu Province, 
China. The two cities are chosen due to their representativeness of the development of 
the land cooperative program. The two cities have pioneered the program in the 
province. They also had the highest numbers of land cooperatives at the time of the data 
collection. In line with the three objectives, data were drawn from different nested 
entities. 
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Objective one concerns the village level and thus structural data from 120 randomly 
selected villages is used. These villages differ with respect to the proportion of land 
dedicated to land cooperatives. From the 120 villages, 60 villages were randomly 
selected. In these 60 villages, 583 households either with or without cooperative 
membership were surveyed using the random walk technique for objective two. After 
excluding households without cooperative membership, the remaining households were 
used for investigating objective three. 
1.3 Literature on Resource Co-management 
I borrow insights from the literature on resource co-management. Generally three types 
of property rights regimes – state property, private property and common property – 
have been distinguished (Feeny et al., 1990). The governance of natural resources under 
state property in transition economies generally reflected political rather than economic 
objectives and caused inefficiency in resource management and in turn in production 
(Macours and Swinnen, 2000). In the pace of system changes and reform efforts, state 
property has been declining and replaced by private property, which, however, only 
achieved efficiency improvement at the initial state of transition but not in the long run 
(Mathijs and Swinnen, 2001). Inefficient markets in transition economies undermine the 
success of private property (Libecap, 2009). As an alternative to the state and private 
property on natural resources, common property or co-management has been 
highlighted (Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 2009). 
Co-management is an important concept in the governance of natural resources (Ostrom, 
1990; Agrawal, 2001). Different types of cooperatives and community-based 
organizations are in use. Co-management refers to a range of institutional arrangements 
for joint decision-making by the state and local resource users (Berkes, 2009). In 
particular, local resource users under a co-management scheme are encouraged to 
participate in decision-making processes on the use of collective resources which may 
also affect their livelihoods. By involving different levels of stakeholders, 
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co-management generally reflects both national and local users’ interests. In practice, it 
may take many forms, but generally involves different degrees of shared management 
authorities or responsibility (Ayers and Kittinger, 2014).  
As a hybrid between state and private property, co-management has two potential 
advantages. First, co-management can be more efficient than state property because 
local users are arguably more familiar with resource conditions, thus they may manage 
resources in a way that better fits the local context conditions (Kumar, 2002). Second, 
co-management may also mitigate market failure: Though private property may also 
promote the efficient use of resources, it often needs complete property rights and 
efficient markets for those resources, which is rarely the case in developing countries 
(Libecap, 2009). In recent years, co-management has been on the political agenda in 
many developing countries (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). 
A potential disadvantage of co-management is that it affords collective action (Acheson, 
2006). Although some communities have successfully established long-lasting resource 
co-management, in other communities efforts to manage resources collectively have 
failed (Ostrom, 1990), i.e., the resource collapsed or only a small portion of the resource 
is co-managed (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). Moreover, there is the criticism that local 
elites often dominate decision-making in co-management and benefit disproportionally. 
In the literature these phenomena are defined as elite control and elite capture, 
respectively (Fritzen, 2007). Debates on the advantages and disadvantages of resource 
co-management draw increasing attention from different perspectives in the literature 
which can be roughly classified into two branches. Table 1.1 summarizes the current 
literature on resource co-management. 
The first branch of literature seeks to understand the success factors of co-management 
programs (Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Cox et al., 2010; Baynes et al., 2015). Several 
studies investigate the community level factors of co-management success, measured as 
emergence, endurance or the amount of resources or resource users of co-management 
activities in a community (Agrawal, 2002; Cox et al., 2010; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; 
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Basurto, 2013). Such studies, however, often fail to establish causal links between 
potential factors and the measure of co-management success due to the use of 
qualitative analysis with small-N samples or single case studies (Agrawal, 2003). 
Quantitative analysis using large sample sizes is rare.  
Other studies tackle the problem by investigating why some local users are engaged in 
resource co-management programs while others are not (Beard, 2005; Jumbe and 
Angelsen, 2007; Jana et al., 2014; Mazunda and Shively, 2015). While these studies 
generally contribute to our understanding of the success factors of co-management from 
a micro perspective, they often do not distinguish between different levels of 
engagement in co-management (Chhetri et al., 2013; Lestari et al., 2015). Many 
resource users do not participate in decision-making processes, although they might be 
officially registered as co-management members (Chhetri et al., 2013). The participation 
of co-management members in decision-making processes, as the most fundamental 
element of resource co-management (Kabir et al., 2011), to date has rarely been 
analyzed. 
Table 1.1 Literature on Success Factors of Co-management and Its Impact 
Levels of 
Analysis 
 
Collective action level 
Membership and labor 
reallocation 
Decision-making and 
access to benefit 
Subjects  Village or community Household or individual Household or individual 
Literature  Some studies  
(Agrawal, 2002; Cox et 
al., 2010; Gutiérrez et 
al., 2011; Basurto, 
2013) 
Some studies on membership 
(Beard, 2005; Jumbe and 
Angelsen, 2007; Jana et al., 
2014; Mazunda and Shively, 
2015); no study available for 
its impact on labor 
reallocation 
No study available 
Methodology  Most qualitative studies Quantitative regression  
Source: Author’s own design. 
 
The second branch of literature investigates the social-economic impact of 
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co-management programs (Mansuri and Rao, 2004, 2012). Several studies focus on the 
linkages between households’ co-management participation and a household’s income 
or access to local resources (Ameha et al., 2014; Mazunda and Shively, 2015; Yadav et 
al., 2015). The impact of co-management participation on other social-economic aspects, 
e.g., household labor allocation, has not received sufficient attention. Informed by the 
commonly known critique on elite capture, some studies investigate the difference in 
access to benefits between elite and non-elite members (Prokopy, 2009; Persha and 
Andersson, 2014). However, empirical knowledge on the linkage between members’ 
participation in decision-making processes and access to benefits remains limited. 
This thesis borrows insights from and also contributes to these two strands of literature. 
Although the Chinese land cooperative program is a unique economic phenomenon, it 
shares many characteristics with the resource co-management programs in other 
countries. More importantly, the issue of land fragmentation tackled by the land 
cooperative program is likely to be relevant to many developing countries, particularly 
transition economies. Thus, research on the success factors and effect of the land 
cooperative program may provide insights not only for China but also for other 
countries. 
1.4 A Framework for Empirical Analysis 
To structure the research process, I first introduce an analytical framework. Analytical 
frameworks are often a starting point for empirical research. They provide an overview 
on the relevant theoretical and empirical relationships between the entities under 
investigation. The main aim of analytical frameworks is to provide insights on 
potentially important sets of factors or variables and to guide the data collection and 
data analysis processes.  
Figure 1.2 shows the framework, which is a modified version of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development framework raised by Ostrom (2005). The Institutional 
Analysis and Development framework summarizes institutional factors, resource 
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characteristics and resource users’ characteristics to understand resource users’ behavior 
and the outcome of co-management schemes. In this thesis, I operationalize the 
Institutional Analysis and Development framework with the integration of factors taken 
from the literature on resource co-management and the local context.  
 
Figure 1.2 An Analytical Framework for Determinants and Impact of Land Cooperatives 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates that households or individuals voluntarily choose to participate in 
the land cooperative program or in decision-making processes within the organizations. 
Such choices are made based on the costs and benefits which are embedded in a 
household’s characteristics, village characteristics, and rules in use. The collective 
choice of households represents collective action in terms of project coverage at the 
village level. Simultaneously, the choices of households affect other economic decisions 
(e.g., labor reallocation) and economic welfare (e.g., access to benefits from land 
cooperatives). 
1.5 Structure of Dissertation 
The rest of the thesis consist three empirical papers and a concluding chapter. 
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The first empirical paper in Chapter Two identifies the success factors of land 
co-management in terms of the proportion of land transferred at the village level. It asks 
why land cooperatives attract more land in some villages than in others. Given the 
similarity in the national policy environment, the paper turns to answer the question 
from the perspective of local contexts, such as differences in the local policy 
environment, village characteristics and cooperative leadership. The paper pays special 
attention to the role of cooperative leaders’ elite status, such as their education or 
political affiliations. 
The second empirical paper in Chapter Three identifies the household level factors of 
cooperative membership. It explains which types of households are more likely to be a 
member of the land cooperative program. It also estimates the causal effect of 
cooperative membership on household heads’ decisions to engage in off-farm 
employment. To address the endogeneity resulting from the simultaneous decisions of 
being a member in the cooperative and engaging in off-farm employment, the paper 
employs a recursive bivariate probit model. The paper also contributes to the 
understanding of household heads’ off-farm employment. 
The third empirical paper in Chapter Four identifies the factors of cooperative 
members’ engagement in decision-making processes and its impact on their access to 
land incomes from cooperatives. It explains which types of cooperative members are 
more likely to participate in decision-making processes and whether the participation 
makes a difference to members’ land income from the cooperatives. To address 
selection bias, the paper applies a novel identification strategy which combines a 
bivariate probit model with propensity score matching. 
In the conclusion chapter, the main findings from the three empirical papers are 
summarized and synthesized. Shortcomings and potential future directions for research 
are highlighted. Lessons and policy implications are derived from the empirical work. 
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Abstract: Land consolidation is an essential aspect of rural restructuring in China. 
Community-based agricultural land consolidation projects were developed to restructure 
the agricultural sector by pooling fragmented land and leasing it as consolidated plots or 
employing laborers to farm the land. Despite the rapid growth in the number of villages 
that generally adopt the approach, the relative amount of farmland managed under the 
program remains low, and empirical studies explaining this variation are scarce. We 
investigate the drivers of land coverage under the program with a particular interest in the 
role of local elites and village characteristics. Using primary data from 120 villages in 
Suzhou City and Yangzhou City, China, our study shows that projects led by government 
officials achieve greater coverage. Other local elites do not play an important role in the 
process. Further investigation indicates that the roles of different types of elites change 
over time. We also find that structural village characteristics such as distance to town, 
village land endowment, and off-farm market participation substantially affect project 
outcomes. The results are robust to different samples and different specifications of the 
econometric model. Rather than generally excluding elites from leadership positions, 
policymakers should actively promote certain types of elites whose involvement might be 
critical for project success. 
Keywords: Cooperatives, land fragmentation, land markets, elite capture, Jiangsu 
Province  
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2.1 Introduction 
Rural China has experienced a rapid transition in the structure of its labor and land. As a 
result of China’s economic growth, massive labor migration from rural to urban areas has 
occurred (Li et al., 2014; Siciliano, 2014). Because primarily old and female farmers 
remain active in farming (Chen et al., 2009) and rapid changes in the use of land (from 
agricultural to construction use) are taking place, concerns regarding national food 
security and the future of Chinese agriculture more generally have arisen (Long et al., 
2009; Su et al., 2011). Land fragmentation caused by industrialization, urbanization 
(Long et al., 2007), and an egalitarian land distribution (Yan et al., 2014) adds to the 
problem by increasing the cost of agricultural production and machinery use. This 
transition has altered the marginal productivity of labor and land, raising the issue of rural 
restructuring (Long et al., 2016).  
Land consolidation represents an indispensable means of restructuring agricultural 
resources in rural China (Long, 2014). Agricultural land consolidation can address the 
challenges arising from a loss of human capital, land fragmentation, and low agricultural 
productivity because it involves concentrating land to encourage intensive farming (Long 
et al., 2010; Demetriou et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2015). Chinese governments have 
begun to initiate agricultural land cooperatives (or nong di gu fen he zuo she in Chinese) 
to facilitate land consolidation with two objectives. First, the program aims to concentrate 
land plots by encouraging land transfer to land cooperatives. By consolidating scattered 
land, which is complemented by the provision of basic infrastructure in some cases, land 
cooperatives can more successfully promote large-scale farming. Second, land 
cooperatives acknowledge that households must voluntarily participate in land transfers 
and the management activities of the cooperative organization (Chen, 2015). Key 
decisions (e.g., the development of cooperative rules or the election of leaders) are made 
in a democratic manner (Ito et al., 2016). Thus, the land cooperative program can best be 
described as a co-management program of land use or community-based land 
consolidation (CBLC). 
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By the end of 2012, thousands of villages in Jiangsu Province had initiated land 
cooperatives. In several villages, no farmland has been transferred through the program. 
However, other villages report that all farmland has been transferred. An understanding 
of the local forces underlying the variation of rural restructuring programs is critical 
(Long et al., 2012). Investigations of local drivers of program development can improve 
our understanding of CBLC and lead to important implications for policymakers at 
different legislative levels. The national government might include land consolidation 
and the development of rural land markets in its overall frameworks. Provincial 
governments and city governments may then develop more detailed policies, programs, 
and schemes that are adapted to local conditions.  
Previous work explored the factors of households’ willingness to participate in CBLC 
(Lin and Ma, 2014). Households that participated in the program reported higher incomes, 
especially from off-farm sector employment (Zhang, 2008). More recently, Ito et al. 
(2016) find that the establishment of the land cooperative program significantly affects 
land transfer. However, to date, research has not explained the variance in the proportion 
of land dedicated to the CBLC across villages. Several studies argue that local elites 
should be excluded from rural restructuring programs because benefits may be unequally 
distributed in favor of elites (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; 
Saito-Jensen et al., 2010). However, other studies find that elites can positively impact 
community-based development projects through their networks, knowledge, and 
resources (Fritzen, 2007; Balooni et al., 2010; Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst, 2015).  
In this paper, we examine the drivers of CBLC in rural China. In particular, we are 
interested in local elites’ role in project implementation. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section two describes the context of CBLC in rural China and 
develops a conceptual framework for analysis. Section three presents an overview of the 
data and analysis methods. Section four reports and discusses the main findings, and 
Section five concludes. 
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2.2 Project Description and Conceptual Framework 
2.2.1 Description of the Land Cooperative Program 
CBLC began as an experiment (Yep, 2015). The fist CBLC project was founded in 
Nanhai City, Guangdong Province in the 1990s. In our research area, Jiangsu Province, 
the concept of CBLC was first applied in Suzhou City in 2002 and then rapidly spread 
across the province. By 2012, the total number of registered land cooperatives in Jiangsu 
Province reached 5,680. Various incentives are established to encourage participation. 
The National Financial Support for Model Agricultural Cooperatives in China (or nong 
min he zuo she shi fan fu chi xiang mu in Chinese) and Opinions about the 
Implementation of Financial Support to Rural Land Transfer in Jiangsu Province (or 
Jiangsu sheng cai zheng fu chi nong cun tu di liu zhuan shi shi yi jian in Chinese) were 
released in 2004 and 2008, respectively. These documents provide financial support for 
the development of CBLC. With the Regulations of Jiangsu Province on Specialized 
Farmers Cooperatives (2009), the program has entered the legal system. These 
regulations explicitly state that cooperative law applies to CBLC projects. 
The CBLC projects consolidate farmland by merging scattered farmland. The 
cooperative either hires farm employees to cultivate the land or leases the land to the 
highest-bidding land user, including outsiders who have not resided in the village. Both 
households and agricultural companies are allowed to rent the land, although the latter 
rarely rent land in our study area. Land users must farm the land and cannot use it for 
other purposes.2 Farm households become shareholders of the land cooperative and 
authorize the organization to manage their land. Typically, the organization gives 
members a fixed rent proportionate to the share of total land. In some cases, bonuses are 
paid contingent on the cooperative’s performance. Exit from the program is regulated. If 
neither the land cooperative nor individual households wish to use land transferred to the 
                                                 
2 Residential land may also be consolidated in some land cooperatives. In this study, we focus only on farmland. 
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program, the land is returned to its original users. If only some households elect to quit, 
they are compensated with comparable plots. In practice, this situation rarely occurs, and 
we are aware of only one case in which land was returned after the program collapsed. 
The program generally follows a participatory approach, and members vote on major 
decisions regarding CBLC projects (Ito et al., 2016). Furthermore, local elites, such as 
university graduates, village officials or government officials (Zhao and Develtere, 2010; 
Zhao, 2011), occupy leadership positions for these projects. In some regions, the village 
committee serves as the land cooperative’s leadership team (Chen, 2015). Local elites are 
critical to the successful initiation of CBLC (Ji and Qian, 2010); however, elite control – 
elites’ dominance in decision-making processes – may raise concerns about the fair 
distribution of benefits from economies of scale or lower transaction costs in land 
markets (Ito et al., 2016). The same concerns apply to government subsidies for 
large-scale farming. In some cases the government incentivizes village officials to 
include more households in the program, which may cause conflicts with households that 
have a comparative advantage in farming and do not wish to transfer their land to the 
program. 
2.2.2 Land Cooperative Programs, Local Forces and Rural Elites 
Although top-down policy implemented to advance large-scale farming is a major driver 
of land consolidation in China (Long, 2014), a main characteristic of CBLC is the 
integration of bottom-up elements. Long et al. (2012) argue that bottom-up elements may 
prevent rural protests and that by involving the locals, land consolidation programs may 
increase the effectiveness of public policy through the creation of incentives and 
opportunities for negotiation (Haldrup, 2015). 
The interaction between macro-level institutions and local factors provides a useful 
theoretical approach to understanding rural restructuring projects (Terluin, 2003; Long, 
2014). Figure 2.1 presents a conceptual framework for analyzing potential drivers of the 
variation in policy implementation. In this conceptual framework, actors negotiate and 
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interact with each other within the contexts of macro-level institutions and local factors to 
reach an agreement, which in turn affects changes in land tenure, household livelihoods, 
and agricultural production in the villages. 
Institutions shape economic activities by providing incentives, defining property rights, 
and enabling or restricting actors’ actions (Bromley, 1989). Policies on CBLC change the 
choice sets and the associated costs and benefits for farm households and project leaders, 
affecting the amount of farmland dedicated to CBLC projects. Laws, regulations, and 
public policies can increase farm households’ rate of participation in the projects by 
offering an adequate legal framework in which new organizations are founded and land 
property rights become more secure (Deng et al., 2010; Ito et al., 2016). Various policy 
instruments affect cooperative programs in China (Deng et al., 2010). In CBLC, a 
technique that has been particularly successful is providing households that transfer their 
land with a financial subsidy (Ito et al., 2016). Evaluations of local cadres’ performance in 
the political hierarchy also contribute to the achievement of public policy targets (Edin, 
2003), and successful cadres may receive annual bonuses or may be promoted to local 
officials (Birney, 2014). 
 
Figure 2.1 Drivers of Spatial Variation in Implementation of the Community-based Land Consolidation 
 
Local forces also play an important role in project success (Terluin, 2003; Koontz, 2005; 
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Tavares et al., 2014). Market access, local off-farm economic activities, natural resource 
endowment, and the capacity of local actors and their networks are key drivers of project 
success. Market access impacts farm households’ decisions regarding whether to 
participate in CBLC. Good access to markets creates opportunities for households to 
leave local collective initiatives (Willy and Holm-Müller, 2013) and increases the value 
of land by reducing transportation cost (Osabuohien, 2014). Land that is closer to the 
town has a higher value because land tenure may shift to urban uses (Chicoine, 1981), and 
this might prevent households from transferring land. 
Local off-farm employment, land endowment, and the degree of land fragmentation are 
also important factors for the implementation of CBLC. The proportion of off-farm 
employment has altered households’ production behavior (Liu et al., 2013) and the 
allocation of land. Chen (2011) shows that CBLC is particularly successful under 
conditions of well-developed off-farm employment. Accordingly, several studies show 
that off-farm employment opportunities significantly impact farmers’ decisions to rent 
out land (Yao, 2000; Tan et al., 2006). Johannes (2002) observes that resource scarcity 
influences community-based resource management. The degree of land fragmentation 
that land consolidation projects aim to address (Long, 2014; Jiang et al., 2015) is also an 
important factor in the process of implementing CBLC. 
Project design and the role of local elites may also affect the implementation of CBLC 
(Fritzen, 2007). Local elites can be generally defined as influential people who have 
substantial power due to their high levels of human capital, social networks, and natural 
resource endowments (Platteau, 2004; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007). Local elites often 
control the decision-making process in community-based development projects due to 
the power that they hold over others. 
Several studies find that local elites involved in community-based development projects 
lack downward accountability and might defalcate project funds by falsifying accounts or 
over-reporting invoices (Platteau, 2004; Iversen et al., 2006). The literature typically 
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labels the unequal distribution of project benefits as “elite capture” (Dasgupta and Beard, 
2007; Lund, 2015). Other studies find that all participants can benefit even when local 
elites disproportionately benefit (Fritzen, 2007; Balooni et al., 2010). Examining the land 
consolidation project in China, Long (2014) observes that project leaders, who are 
primarily rural elites, can strengthen the cohesiveness of villages to implement the project. 
A study conducted by Dasgupta and Beard (2007) also indicates that relative to projects in 
which power is evenly distributed, projects controlled by local elites succeed in 
delivering benefits to the targeted poor. Taken together, these studies suggest that local 
elites are able to use their knowledge, expert skills, and social and political networks to 
increase local participation in collective action (Balooni et al., 2010), even in the presence 
of elite capture. 
In CBLC, three types of rural elites can be identified: (1) people with higher education, (2) 
village officials, and (3) government officials. Marvel and Lumpkin (2007) argue that 
education increases a person’s information and skills, including those needed to 
successfully recognize and pursue business opportunities. A good education also 
influences access to local information, which might have a positive impact on an 
individual’s ability to coordinate collective natural resource management (Pretty, 2003). 
A higher educational level has also been shown to positively affect organizational 
performance more generally (Bates, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997). In CBLC, education may 
be particularly valuable in terms of helping individuals discover business opportunities, 
such as contracting with potential land users3. 
Most leaders of CBLC projects are village officials with good access to local information 
and high levels of social capital within the community. However, village officials may 
also wish to avoid conflicts with other villagers during project implementation, especially 
                                                 
3 Further research might also explore the impact of land users, i.e., individuals and corporations that rent the land, on 
project success. 
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when other villagers are reluctant to participate. Evidence from the Philippines suggests 
that village officials’ preferences are aligned with the preferences of households in the 
middle quartiles of the village asset distribution (Labonne and Chase, 2009). This finding 
indicates that to ensure successful reelections in the future, village officials may not 
promote projects that are not supported by the majority in the village. In the Chinese case, 
village officials are elected by the local population but paid by the government (Oi, 1995; 
Landry, 2008). Thus, their roles in CBLC are more complex. At the beginning of a project, 
leaders’ preferences might be aligned with those of members of their community. Later, 
leaders may promote CBLC projects due to political pressure and their recognition of the 
project’s potential economic benefits. 
A few leaders of CBLC projects are government officials with political connections. 
From the perspective of rent-seeking, when project leaders have political connections, the 
project or its leader is more likely to receive financial support from the government 
(Caeyers and Dercon, 2012). Such financial support has been identified as a key factor in 
the development of cooperative organizations (Ito et al., 2016). Hence, a positive 
relationship between the appointment of a government official as the project leader and 
project coverage is expected. 
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
2.3.1 Study Area, Sampling, and Data 
Our study area comprises five counties – Kunshan, Zhangjiagang, Jiangdu, Gaoyou and 
Baoying – in Suzhou and Yangzhou City.4 The two cities differ economically. In 2013, 
the per capita gross domestic product was 123,209 RMB Yuan in Suzhou City and 72,775 
RMB Yuan in Yangzhou City. Despite these differences, the two cities have the highest 
number of registered CBLC projects in Jiangsu Province. By the end of 2012, there were 
                                                 
4 The administration in China is organized hierarchically as follows: states, provinces, cities, counties, and towns. 
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483 land cooperatives in Suzhou and 1,063 in Yangzhou City. These programs are 
primarily located in the five selected counties. Figure 2.2 shows the location of the study 
area. 
 
Figure 2.2 Study Area Location 
 
The two cities also differ in their political support for CBLC. Kunshan and Zhangjiagang 
County, which are located in Suzhou City, provide a subsidy of 400 RMB Yuan and 300 
RMB Yuan per mu5, respectively, to households whose farmland is utilized in the CBLC; 
this subsidy is in addition to the rent received from the organization. Although these 
payments alone are not sufficient to sustain a household’s livelihood, they constitute a 
considerable supplement to other income sources. 
A nested sampling strategy was used to draw the sample. We first randomly selected 
                                                 
5 RMB Yuan is the currency used in China. One Euro equaled approximately 7.5 RMB Yuan at the time that the research was 
conducted. Furthermore, 15 mu equal one hectare. 
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towns and then randomly selected sample villages with land cooperative programs in 
these towns.6 The selection process was conducted prior to the main fieldwork and was 
based on a list of all land cooperative projects registered in Jiangsu Province by the end of 
2012. The final sample consisted of 120 villages of the 1,546 total villages with CBLC in 
Yangzhou City and Suzhou City.  
A village-level interview was conducted to obtain information on each village. In addition, 
a program-level interview was conducted. The main respondents were village 
accountants and project accountants who were able to provide information about 
structural aspects of the village and the state of the cooperative project. Data collection in 
a village lasted approximately two hours, on average. To ensure accuracy and discourage 
misreporting, we referenced official reporting forms submitted to the government during 
the interview. The structured questionnaires contained several modules. At the village 
level, information was gathered on village land endowment, social-economic conditions, 
policies and institutional arrangements related to CBLC. At the program level, 
information was gathered on the amount of land in the cooperative, the organization’s use 
of land, and cooperative leaders’ socioeconomic backgrounds.  
2.3.2 Empirical Model 
Different types of methods are available to answer different types of research questions. 
Yin (2013) develops a heuristic of applicable research methods. A method is selected 
based on three factors: (1) the form of the research question, (2) the need to control for 
behavioral events, and (3) the temporal focus of the study. In this research, we are 
interested in estimating the size of effects, do not need to control for behavioral events, 
and are interested in contemporary events. Consequently, we employ a quantitative 
                                                 
6 Towns were selected in proportion to the number of cooperatives. In each town, six villages were selected. The sample was drawn 
using the random number generator in Excel. 
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survey with a structured questionnaire (Yin, 2013). 
We use the total area of farmland consolidated and transferred through the land 
cooperative divided by the total farmland in one village as the main dependent variable 
throughout this paper. The proportion of land under cooperative management can take 
values between 0 and 100. We estimate the following equation:    Yi =  α + βXi + γZi + ei      (1)  
where Yi  is the proportion of land under cooperative management in village 𝑖𝑖 , 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 
captures a set of the project leader’s characteristics, and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 is a matrix of village-specific 
factors in village 𝑖𝑖. The α, β, and γ are parameters that are estimated, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 is an error 
term assumed to be independent and identically distributed. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  consists of dummy 
variables indicating whether a project leader is a university graduate, a village official, or 
a government official. Because land consolidation and some village social-economic 
characteristics may have mutual impacts, the values for village characteristics are from 
the year directly before the project was implemented in the village. Accordingly, we add a 
project duration variable to capture the time effect. A dummy variable for the city 
(Suzhou) is also included to control for the effect of differences in cities (e.g., the 
different financing policies in Suzhou City and Yangzhou City). 
When a dependent variable is continuous, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the 
most commonly used method. However, when one or two ends of the data are censored, 
the OLS estimator may produce out-of-interval predictions and biased estimates. The 
data are censored at 0 on the left and at 100 at the right. A Tobit model might be more 
appropriate in this case. Here, we present results from both models to determine the 
robustness of the estimates.  
The dynamic change in the effect of elite control over time is also of interest. To explore 
this effect, we add an interaction term between elite characteristics and project duration to 
equation (1). The model then becomes: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝛷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖      (2) 
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where Xi ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  represents the interaction between a project leader’s 
characteristics and project duration in village 𝑖𝑖. Positive coefficients indicate that the 
effect of elite control increases over time. 
2.3.3 Variable Definition and Expected Signs 
Table 2.1 defines the variables and the expected sign of the coefficient estimates. Our 
dependent variable is the proportion of farmland transferred through the CBLC at the end 
of 2013. The main independent variables of interest are those that identify leaders’ 
position, such as education, village official and government official. As demonstrated 
before, positive effect is expected. 
Table 2.1 Definition of Variables 
Variables Description Expected sign 
Proportion Proportion of farmland in a village dedicated to CBLC at the end of 
2013 
 
Dist_town Distance to town government (km) + 
Off_farm Percentage of households in a village that participated or partially 
participated in the off-farm employment market before the project 
began (%) 
+ 
Landholding Average household landholding before the project began (mu per 
household) 
- 
Plot_No. Average number of land plots per household before the project 
began 
+ 
Evaluation Is the scale of the CBLC related to village leaders’ performance 
evaluation? (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
+ 
Duration Project duration as of 2013 (years) - 
Suzhou The city in which the village is located (1 = Suzhou; 0 = Yangzhou) + 
Education Is the project leader a university graduate? (1 = yes; 0 = no) + 
Official_vill Is the project leader a village official? (1 = yes; 0 = no) + 
Official_gov Is the project leader a government official? (1 = yes; 0 = no) + 
Source: Authors’ own design  
 
Independent variables and the expected direction of the relationship are derived from the 
framework presented in Section two. We use the distance between the village and the 
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town government (Dist_town) to capture the effect of market access, and a positive sign is 
expected. The effect of rural-urban labor migration is captured by the percentage of 
households that purely or partially worked in the off-farm sector in villages before the 
program was initiated (Off_farm). We expect a positive effect because an increase in 
off-farm employment in villages can drive the demand for land consolidation (Vranken 
and Swinnen, 2006; Siciliano, 2012). We use average household landholding before 
CBLC was implemented in villages (Landholding) to indicate resource scarcity and 
expect its sign to be negative (Johannes, 2002). The average number of land plots per 
household before CBLC was initiated in villages (Plot_No) is used to indicate land 
fragmentation (Hartvigsen, 2014), and we expect a positive sign.  
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dependent variable      
Coverage 120 50.78 38.12 0 100 
Control variables      
Dist_town 120 6.20 4.51 0 25 
Off_farm 120 81.95 25.51 0 100 
Landholding 120 4.08 2.31 0.27 10.67 
Plot_No. 120 2.71 1.38 1 10 
Evaluation 120 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Duration 120 3.93 1.68 1 8 
Suzhou 120 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Leader variables      
Education 120 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Official_vill 120 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Official_gov 120 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Source: Authors’ computations 
 
To investigate the impact of institutions, we include a binary variable of village leaders’ 
performance evaluation (Evaluation) and expect a positive sign. We use the city dummy 
(Suzhou) to control for other institutional factors, e.g., financial support for CBLC in 
Suzhou. We also control for program duration (Duration), which may have a positive 
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impact on program outcomes, because as the duration of a program increases, the amount 
of land involved in the project should increase. 
 
Figure 2.3 The Distribution of the Proportion of Agricultural Land in Villages Dedicated to the Program 
 
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the regression models. The 
minimum observed value of coverage is 0, indicating that no farmland was transacted 
through the project in the year of 2013. The maximum value of coverage is 100, 
demonstrating that in some villages, all the farmland was transacted through the project. 
The average proportion of project coverage in the samples is 50.78 (See Figure 2.3 the 
distribution of the proportion of land in different villages dedicated to the program). Table 
2.2 also reveals that 47% of the project leaders are university graduates, 90% are village 
officials, and 8% are government officials. 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
2.4.1 Primary Results 
Table 2.3 reports the results of the linear (OLS) regression of equation (1). All models use 
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robust standard errors. Column (1) presents a baseline model that includes village factors, 
project duration, and the city dummy. In columns (2) through (4), we add each of the 
variables representing the elites’ characteristics to the baseline model. A model including 
all three of these variables is presented in column (5) to isolate the effect of each type of 
elite because a project leader may have two or three of the elite characteristics defined in 
our paper. 
All models perform well in terms of R² and F-statistics. The overall explanatory power of 
the models is high. No problems with multicollinearity are found, as indicated by low 
variance inflation factors (available from the authors upon request), and residuals are 
normally distributed. Model (5) shows that five values exceed 100 and that none of the 
values are negative. These results indicate that the censored dependent variable is not 
problematic. In spite of this finding, we estimate a number of Tobit models, which show 
that the coefficients do not change substantially from the OLS estimates (See Table A 2- 1 
in the appendix). In Table A 2- 2, we report the results of the OLS regressions after log 
transformation. As shown, no significant change in the signs or levels of statistical 
significance is evident for the variables. 
Regional heterogeneity may raise the concern that the data cannot be pooled across the 
two cities. We regressed a version of equation (1) that adds interaction terms between all 
explanatory variables and the city dummy (Liu and Henningsen, 2016). A Chow test 
shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero coefficients for all interaction 
terms, indicating that the data can be pooled across cities. Some respondents reported 
very high or low values for Off_farm and Plot_No (Table 2.2). These values occur 
because official data are not available and, thus, we rely on respondents’ reports. 
Although it is unreasonable to expect that a village’s households have, on average, only 
one plot or that all households have a member participating in off-farm labor, we have no 
reason to believe that the general tendency of these values is incorrect or biased. As a 
robustness check, Table A 2- 3 re-estimates the model based on a sample that excludes 
extreme values. This change in the sample does not change the main results. 
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Table 2.3 Results of OLS Regression 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dist_town 1.866*** 1.848*** 1.833*** 1.681*** 1.639*** 
 
(0.504) (0.504) (0.502) (0.462) (0.453) 
Off_farm 0.266*** 0.260*** 0.265*** 0.234** 0.231** 
 
(0.098) (0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.096) 
Landholding -4.101*** -3.992*** -4.122*** -3.947*** -3.906*** 
 
(1.442) (1.465) (1.407) (1.431) (1.420) 
Plot_no. 1.780 1.860 1.955 1.947 2.167 
 
(1.699) (1.659) (1.759) (1.676) (1.719) 
Evaluation 16.643** 16.446** 16.359** 16.155** 15.760** 
 
(7.218) (7.288) (7.096) (6.974) (6.934) 
Duration -2.034 -1.946 -1.881 -2.201 -1.994 
 
(1.585) (1.613) (1.557) (1.535) (1.540) 
Suzhou 33.487*** 32.075*** 32.450*** 33.504*** 31.644*** 
 
(8.017) (8.383) (7.946) (8.053) (8.345) 
Education 
 
3.892 
  
2.263 
  
(5.938) 
  
(5.977) 
Official_vill 
  
8.831 
 
8.850 
   
(7.850) 
 
(7.994) 
Official_gov 
   
18.735** 18.552** 
    
(7.994) (7.776) 
Constant 22.695* 20.965 14.423 24.551** 15.237 
 
(12.658) (13.590) (14.674) (12.224) (15.089) 
F 29.552 26.035 25.510 26.095 20.638 
Adjusted R2 0.487 0.485 0.487 0.501 0.498 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
Source: Authors’ computations; Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses; *** p < 
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
Table 2.3 shows that the estimated effect of the project leaders’ educational level is 
positive. Projects led by university graduates transfer more farmland to the CBLC; this 
result is consistent with our expectation. However, the effect is statistically 
non-significant at the ten percent level. One may argue that an increase in actual 
knowledge and skills depends not only on years of schooling and formal levels of 
 34 
education but also on other skills that cannot be easily measured. For example, a manager 
with a good general education in a non-business field may not be able to contribute to 
organizational performance (Unger et al., 2011; Ganotakis, 2012). 
Village officials who are cooperative leaders can positively impact the share of land under 
cooperative management. However, this effect is not statistically significantly different 
from zero. Evidence from Indonesia shows that elected village officials may, to some 
extent, have preferences consistent with those of the majority of community members 
(Labonne and Chase, 2009). Therefore, village officials may not exert much effort to 
implement an experimental reform (Yep, 2015) that may elicit conflicts among skeptical 
farmers.  
In line with our expectation, the effect of the appointment of a government official as the 
project leader is positive. The effect is large and significantly different from zero at the 
five percent level. Specifically, a government official in the leadership position increases 
the proportion of land under cooperative management by approximately 20 percent. 
Cooperative leaders who are well connected to governments may more easily access 
subsidies and other support. This explanation is in line with the results of a previous study, 
which showed that the daily relationship between cooperative leaders and local 
governments is the most important determinant of whether cooperatives receive national 
financial support (Zhao, 2015). 
In line with our expectation, distance to the town center as a measure of market access has 
a statistically significant and positive impact on the area under cooperative management. 
An increase in the distance to the town center by one kilometer increases the share of land 
under cooperative management by 1.5%. The percentage of households that participated 
in off-farm employment has a positive sign, as expected. Villages in which off-farm 
employment prevails are more likely to have larger areas under cooperative management, 
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consistent with earlier findings that off-farm employment can facilitate land markets (Tan 
et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2012)7. According to the coefficient estimates in column (5), a 
one-unit increase in the proportion of households in the off-farm employment market 
may trigger a rise in the relative amount of farmland involved in the CBLC by 0.231%. 
The effect of the average household landholding is negative and significantly different 
from zero. A one-unit increase in the average household landholding decreases the 
project’s coverage of farmland by approximatly four percent. An intuitive explanation is 
that a low average endowment of farmland might represent an inefficient scale of 
production; this might be resolved by pooling the land in cooperatives. Similarly, 
Johannes (2002) observes that resource scarcity increases the likelihood that collective 
natural resource management is implemented.  
The average number of land plots per household shows the expected positive sign, 
suggesting that villages with more fragmented land can draw more farmland to CBLC 
because land fragmentation is a key driver of the start and development of consolidation 
projects (Long, 2014; Jiang et al., 2015). However, this effect is not significantly different 
from zero, casting some doubt on the aim of addressing land fragmentation through 
CBLC. Similarly, we do not find a significant impact of program duration on the 
propotion of land dedicated to the program. 
The city dummy is positive and significant, suggesting that villages in Suzhou City are 
more likely to draw farmland to CBLC. CBLC projects in Suzhou City cover a proportion 
of land that is 31.09% larger, on average, than that covered by projects in Yangzhou City. 
Although, in principle, many factors could drive this result, one important factor might be 
                                                 
7 For the variables Dist_town and Off_farm, one may suspect that people living closer to the city are also more likely to be employed 
in the off-farm sector. Thus, we calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient (r = -0.137). The correlation is small and statistically not 
significantly different from zero. One explanation for this lack of correlation is that most villages are located relatively close to the city, 
as the highest recorded distance in our sample is 25 kilometers (see Table 2.2). 
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differences in local financial support. Indeed, Ito et al. (2016) find that subsidies from the 
local government can significantly improve the ratio of consolidated land. 
2.4.2 Further Investigation of the Effect of Elite Control 
To investigate the effect of changes in elites’ control over time, we add the interaction 
between project duration and project leaders’ characteristics. Table 2.4 reports the results 
of OLS regressions that take into account the interaction between elite control and project 
duration. 
Table 2.4 Results of OLS Regressions Including Interaction Effect 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dist_town 1.584*** 1.657*** 1.644*** 
 (0.458) (0.456) (0.457) 
Off_farm 0.190** 0.232** 0.232** 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.098) 
Landholding -4.368*** -4.538*** -3.917*** 
 (1.398) (1.441) (1.422) 
Plot_no. 2.180 2.224 2.121 
 (1.656) (1.759) (1.749) 
Evaluation 15.412** 16.442** 15.889** 
 (6.694) (6.725) (6.954) 
Suzhou 31.828*** 28.921*** 31.359*** 
 (8.287) (8.502) (8.558) 
Duration -4.721*** -7.380*** -1.862 
 (1.779) (2.404) (1.667) 
Education -23.671** 1.384 2.370 
 (11.342) (5.871) (6.036) 
Official_vill 6.138 -17.902 8.708 
 (7.860) (13.160) (8.011) 
Official_gov 18.120** 19.465*** 23.808 
 (7.237) (7.273) (20.638) 
Education×Duration 6.594**   
 (2.769)   
Official_vill×Duration  6.472**  
  (2.776)  
Official_gov×Duration   -1.241 
 37 
 
   (4.843) 
Constant 34.033* 41.158** 14.881 
 (17.274) (17.127) (15.428) 
F 20.337 20.616 18.683 
Adjusted R2 0.514 0.505 0.494 
Observations 120 120 120 
Source: Authors’ computations 
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
The interaction between education and project duration is positive and significant, 
implying that projects led by university graduates draw a larger proportion of farmland to 
the project over time. Learning processes could explain this finding. New businesses are 
more likely to fail if they are controlled by new businesses’ managers because such 
managers have the least specific knowledge and skills at the starting point (Bates, 1990). 
Over time, educated project leaders learn more quickly, helping them to better manage 
farmland. 
The interaction between village officials and project duration is also positive and 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that projects led by village officials draw more 
farmland to the project, particularly when the project runs for a longer time period. In 
community-based projects, the relationship between elites and non-elites may change 
over time due to the general acceptance and legitimacy of the aim of the proposed project 
and the recognition of their preferences (Lund and Saito-Jensen, 2013). In the case of 
CBLC, a higher degree of legal stability and the perception of potential project benefits 
over time may encourage village officials to include more farmland. 
The interaction between government officials and project duration becomes 
non-significant, indicating that the advantage that government officials enjoy does not 
substantially change over time. This result is intuitive considering that national and 
provincial financial support can be granted only once. Government officials may take 
advantage of their political networks to receive financial funding from the government 
only once, especially in the early years. However, in later years, project performance may 
 38 
remain constant or even drop when support fails. In other words, implementing a project 
with government officials as project leaders may pay off at first but does not result in 
larger long-term benefits. 
2.4.3 General Discussion 
In the estimated models, the appointment of a government official as the project leader 
has a large and significant effect on project success, and this effect might be explained by 
the leader’s ability to access social networks. 8  According to the cooperative law, 
participation in CBLC projects should be voluntary. In the vast majority of cases, project 
leaders do not place disproportionate pressure on farmers to join CBLC projects. During 
the pre-survey portion of the fieldwork, we encountered one case in which a farmer’s 
plants were cut down to force him into the CBLC project. However, such cases are rare. 
In a few cases, farmers lose access to irrigation due to CBLC projects. Typically, 
irrigation is organized collectively by the village committee. If many farmers join the 
CBLC project and the pooled land is rented to large-scale investors, the village committee 
might stop the supply of irrigation water to dispersed farmers who did not contribute their 
land. Although project leaders do not exert pressure on these farmers in these cases, 
affected farmers are placed at a disadvantage. 
One objective of the CBLC project is to reduce land fragmentation. Thus, one might 
expect that a high degree of land fragmentation is an important driver of project success. 
However, we do not find a large effect of land fragmentation. The consolidation of 
fragmented land to increase agricultural productivity is a crucial problem not only for 
China but also for other economies in transition. Van Huylenbroeck et al. (1996) propose 
an evaluation tool that can be used to compare consolidation successes and failures across 
                                                 
8 In our regression, we do not specifically consider social capital. An in-depth analysis based on the network theory of social capital 
requires a different method and a more detailed analysis (Balooni et al., 2010). Thus, we do not perform an analysis of informal social 
networks or clearly distinguish between bridging and bonding types of social capital because such analysis requires a more detailed 
conceptual model and definition (Paldam, 2000; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). In the Chinese context, the consideration of the 
concept of guanxi also calls for a more elaborate treatment of informal networks (Yan, 1996). 
 39 
 
countries, but the simple replication of policies from countries with long-lasting land 
consolidation practices can have negative effects due to fundamental incompatibility with 
the institutional environment and structural peculiarities (van Dijk, 2007; Djanibekov et 
al., 2012). The case of Albania highlights this point. Policies designed to tackle the 
consolidation of fragmented land are in place; however, land transfer is impaired by 
inefficient land markets (Deininger et al., 2012). Although land consolidation 
cooperatives might be an effective instrument for successful rural restructuring in other 
contexts, in China, the peculiar role of elites and the specific institutional environment 
should be considered before general conclusions are drawn from our results.  
2.5 Conclusions 
In China, CBLC is an essential part of rural restructuring to improve the efficiency of 
agricultural production. This study examined the effect of local forces on the 
implementation of the CBLC program, as measured by the proportion of agricultural land 
transferred through the program. Our conceptual model distinguished village features, 
macro institutions, and project design as drivers of land consolidation. All three 
dimensions shape project outcomes. 
We find that village features, such as distance to town and off-farm market participation 
significantly affect program outcomes. Unlike previous studies, and in contrast to the 
objectives of the land cooperatives program, we do not find that land fragmentation 
drives land consolidation. Governments that intend to develop community-based 
agricultural land consolidation programs therefore should prioritize villages that are far 
from the town center, have low levels of land endowment, and have high off-farm market 
participation. 
We also show that the program develops more effectively when the scale of the program 
is part of the village leaders’ performance evaluation system. In other words, projects 
must be designed in a way that holds village leaders accountable. Policymakers might 
consider extending leader evaluation programs in the future, while ensuring that leaders 
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do not abuse their power. We find substantial differences in land consolidation rates 
between the two cities we study. Arguably, macro institutions, i.e., the local legal 
framework, can positively impact land consolidation. Most notably, subsidies increase 
the attractiveness of land cooperatives. 
Local elites who lead CBLC projects are able to promote the projects in some cases. This 
is particularly true for government officials, who have a large effect on the proportion of 
land under cooperative management. Interaction effects of different types of local elites 
and project duration suggest that the role of local elites changes over time. In the short 
term, government officials are successful. However, for long-run success, more educated 
people and village officials should be encouraged to lead the project. Our findings 
support recent studies' notion that local elites can be a blessing to local participation in 
community-based development programs. Based on these results, we argue that 
excluding the local elites from leadership positions in community-based development 
projects may come at a price. 
Despite the positive role of local elites in promoting local participation, we do not suggest 
that elite control is harmless. Indeed, many studies highlight the presence of elite capture 
in community-based development programs. Regarding the CBLC program, we cannot 
rule out the possibility of elite capture. Further studies that examine the topic in greater 
depth are needed. However, governments should account for the role and interests of 
local elites when developing community-based development projects. Systems that 
minimize the potential negative effects of elite involvement while maintaining the 
positive effects are needed. 
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Abstract: Functioning land markets are necessary for an increase in off-farm 
employment. However, there is limited empirical evidence on the impact of land 
transfer on off-farm employment in rural China. This paper investigates the drivers of 
households’ cooperative membership, which is equivalent to transferring land through 
land cooperatives, and its impact on off-farm employment. Using a two-step control 
function approach and data from Suzhou and Yangzhou (Jiangsu province), we do not 
find a general effect of cooperative membership on household heads’ current off-farm 
employment, though the effect is large for households which had surplus agricultural 
labor before cooperative initiation. The effect is also positive and large for household 
heads without off-farm experience and households located in Yangzhou. Policy-makers 
should be aware of the distributional consequences of these heterogeneous effects. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Off-farm employment helps to diversify and increase rural households’ income 
(Atamanov and van den Berg, 2012). Because added value per worker is higher in the 
off-farm sector (Gollin et al., 2014), off-farm employment is an important source of 
household income contributing to poverty alleviation in rural areas. In addition, 
off-farm income provides cash for purchasing inputs to increase agricultural production 
(Matshe and Young, 2004). In recent years, developing counties such as Mexico 
(Valsecchi, 2014), Vietnam (Do and Iyer, 2008) and China (Groom et al., 2009; Uchida 
et al., 2009), have, thus, made an effort to facilitate a shift in labor employment from 
agriculture to off-farm sectors. 
Rural land market development can facilitate off-farm employment (Mullan et al., 2011; 
Chernina et al., 2014). Because land and labor are complementary inputs in agricultural 
production (Hertel, 1989), a change in the employment of labor may typically go along 
with a change in the employment of land. Empirical evidence shows that farmers’ land 
transfer decisions and off-farm employment decisions are closely interrelated (Feng and 
Heerink, 2008). However, it is important to further acknowledge this interrelation. 
Several studies have investigated the impact of off-farm employment on land market 
participation (Kung, 2002; Huang et al., 2012; Yan and Huo, 2016). However, only a 
few studies (Shi et al., 2007; Yan et al., 2014) have investigated the effect of land 
market participation on labor market participation in rural China, often ignoring the 
endogeneity of households’ land transfer decisions. 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of land transfer on off-farm employment, using 
data from the land cooperative program in China. This is the first attempt to consider the 
causal effect of land cooperative membership on off-farm employment. We employ a 
two-step control function approach to address the endogeneity of cooperative 
membership (Wooldridge, 2014). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section two we provide some background on the land cooperative program and 
demonstrate why cooperative membership may affect off-farm employment. In section 
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three, we describe the data and empirical strategy. In section four, we present and 
discuss the results, followed by a concluding section. 
3.2 Institutional Background and Context 
3.2.1 Land Cooperative Program 
Rural land in China is governed under the household responsibility system. Farmers 
contract with village committees to use land for agricultural production. For political 
reasons, land cannot be privatized in China, but contracts give households rights to use 
land and transfer it in rental markets. However, the egalitarian principle and the 
redistribution of land in response to population change have led to land fragmentation 
and insecure property rights. High transaction costs hinder the development of an 
efficient land market (Jin and Deininger, 2009; Bao et al., 2015). 
At the beginning of the 21st century, land and labor markets in rural China remain 
underdeveloped (Kung, 2002). According to the Agricultural Committee of the province, 
in 2006 in Jiangsu Province, one of the most developed regions in China, less than 10% 
of the agricultural land has ever been traded in the rental market. This figure is even 
higher than the national average (Ito et al., 2016). Despite the ongoing shift of labor 
from the agricultural to off-farm sectors, labor employment in agriculture in 2005 was 
still at approximately 45% (Deininger et al., 2014). This provides an opportunity to 
achieve greater economic efficiency by developing factor markets in rural areas (Zhang 
and Tan, 2007). 
The land cooperative program was initiated to facilitate land transfer and to release rural 
labor (Lin and Ma, 2014; Chen, 2015). In the early 1990s, it was first applied in Nanhai, 
Guangdong Province. In different local variations the program is now viewed as an 
important part of a collective economy by the central government, and it spread widely 
across the coastal provinces (Tian and Zhu, 2013; Chen, 2015). Jiangsu is the only 
province which has legally implemented the program via the release of the Regulations 
of Jiangsu Province on Specialized Farmers Cooperatives in 2009. The program is also 
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implemented differently within the province. In Suzhou, for instance, the local 
government provides financial support to households who transfer land to the program. 
Similar support does not exist in other cities of the province. Such policy variation may 
indicate regional differences in the importance of the program.  
Households that transfer land to the cooperative become its members and receive benefits 
in the form of stocks (Ito et al., 2016). The stocks issued by the cooperative make the 
households’ land contract rights – the right to get a share of farmland in the village – 
independent from the direct use of land.9 Households then can transfer land to the 
cooperatives while retaining the right to benefit from the land. The stocks can be 
mortgaged, transferred, and inherited. Such institutional arrangements avoid the 
periodical land reallocation and secure households’ land contracts right (Po, 2008; Ito et 
al., 2016).  
The security of land contracts rights may encourage land transfer (Deininger et al., 
2014). Because the land cooperative becomes the central contracting partner in a village, 
households have to deal with only one transacting partner which saves them costs of 
searching for and negotiating with others in the village (Bao et al., 2015). It is reported 
that between the start of the land cooperative program and 2013 approximately 50% of 
land has been traded in rental markets in Jiangsu (Ito et al., 2016). 
3.2.2 Impact of Cooperative Membership on Off-farm Employment 
We expect that households’ cooperative membership, which is equivalent to transferring 
land through cooperatives, has a positive effect on households’ off-farm employment. 
This results from the complementary nature of land and labor in agricultural production 
and the assumption of imperfect land markets in China. If the local land and labor 
markets were perfect, land and labor resources would have been efficiently allocated. 
                                                 
9 This is the major difference between the land cooperative program and the collectivization policy in the Maoist 
period when farmers were not free to choose how to use the land. 
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The emergence of land cooperatives would then have no effect on households’ labor 
allocation. 
However, it has been well recognized that land markets in rural China are imperfect 
(Kung, 2002; Deininger et al., 2014). Land fragmentation and insecure property rights 
have hindered the development of land rental markets (Bao et al., 2015; Ito et al., 2016). 
Consequently, a smaller amount of land had been traded and fewer farmers had engaged 
in the off-farm sector due to the risk of losing future benefits from land, i.e. the risk of 
land dispossession from land re-distribution (Kung, 2002). The emergence of land 
cooperatives, which secure households’ future benefits from land, therefore provides 
households the opportunity to engage in the off-farm sector by transferring land to 
cooperatives. 
The effect of cooperative membership on off-farm employment also depends on 
households’ ability to access the labor market. Because the income gap between the 
farm and the off-farm sector often differs for heterogeneous households, they may 
choose different production strategies (Yao, 2000). Some would specialize in the 
off-farm sector if they had access to well-paid off-farm employment before cooperative 
initiation, which could surpass the risk of losing benefits from land. These households 
often used their land inefficiently when land markets were imperfect, for instance by 
giving it to kin relatives for free. Land cooperatives then provide them the opportunity 
to maximize benefits from land without an impact on labor allocation.  
Others would focus on agriculture if potential off-farm employment available to them 
could not surpass the risk of losing future benefits from land due to insecure property 
rights. The restrictions from imperfect land markets on labor allocation are much 
stronger for these households. More agricultural labor would be constrained in 
agriculture. Because land cooperatives to some extent secure households’ income from 
contract land, the effect of cooperative membership on these households’ off-farm 
employment is expected to be larger. 
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3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.3.1 Data Collection 
The data were collected in 2014 in Suzhou and Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, China. We 
chose the two cities because they were the first to develop the land cooperative program 
in the province. Compared to other cities in the province, they had the highest number of 
land cooperatives by the time of our survey. By the end of 2012, the number of land 
cooperatives in Suzhou and Yangzhou were 483 and 1063, respectively. The two cities are 
typical for the development of the land cooperative program rather than for the 
development of rural areas in China more generally. In 2013, the per capita gross 
domestic product in China was 41,908 RMB Yuan, while in Suzhou and Yangzhou these 
figures were much higher, with 123,209 RMB Yuan and 72,775 RMB Yuan, 
respectively. 10  Dynamic economic growth led to labor migration especially of 
middle-aged farmers, leaving the elderly behind on the farms (Long et al., 2016). Such 
labor migration, however, has not resulted in large land transfers until the start of the land 
cooperative program (Ito et al., 2016). 
We randomly selected 60 villages from a list of villages which had land cooperatives in 
the two cities. We did not include villages without land cooperatives to avoid a selection 
bias at the village level, because households from those villages cannot join the program. 
Data were collected at the village and household levels with the help of ten students from 
Nanjing Agricultural University. Students used the random walk technique to select 
households. Information was obtained on basic village characteristics, cooperative 
leadership, and household characteristics, using a structured questionnaire and 
face-to-face interviews. In total, our cross-sectional dataset consists of 545 observations 
at the household level.11 
                                                 
10 Data are drawn from the China Statistical Yearbook (2014) and the Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook (2014). 
11 In total, 583 households from the 60 villages were interviewed. We exclude 38 households that have no land in the 
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3.3.2 Estimation Strategy 
Because we are particularly interested in the interaction of land transfer and off-farm 
employment, we do not explicitly distinguish between local off-farm employment and 
distant off-farm employment (Shi et al., 2007). We focus on the off-farm employment of 
household heads who play a major role in the agricultural labor force (Long et al., 2016). 
We specify the following models to investigate the determinants of a household’s land 
labor market decisions: 
 𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝛼𝛼1𝑋𝑋 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑍𝑍 + 𝛿𝛿, 𝑀𝑀 =  � 1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀∗  ≥ 00, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 ; (1)   
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂∗ = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀 + µ, 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 =  � 1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂∗  ≥ 00, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒  ;  (2)   
where 𝑀𝑀∗  and 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂∗  are latent variables denoting the utility from cooperative 
membership and off-farm employment, respectively. 𝑀𝑀 and 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 are the observed binary 
variables measuring cooperative membership (= 1 if household is a member, = 0 
otherwise) and off-farm employment (= 1 if household head has off-farm employment, = 
0 otherwise), respectively. 𝑋𝑋 is a set of exogenous factors that determine both decisions, 
and 𝑍𝑍  includes instrumental variables that only affect  𝑀𝑀 . 𝛼𝛼1 , 𝛼𝛼2  and 𝛽𝛽1  are 
coefficient vectors to be estimated. 𝑀𝑀 is added in the off-farm employment Eq. (2) to 
estimate the causal effect of cooperative membership on off-farm employment 𝛽𝛽2. The δ 
and 𝜇𝜇 are error terms. 
The causal effect of cooperative membership on off-farm employment can be identified 
by estimating a probit model if the error terms δ and µ are uncorrelated. However, if 
their covariance ρ is not equal to zero, 𝛽𝛽2 is biased due to endogeneity, resulting from 
reverse causality or the simultaneity of both decisions. We include household heads’ 
off-farm experience before the program to remedy reverse causality. A straightforward 
                                                                                                                                               
village, because they are not qualified to join a land cooperative. 
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approach to address the simultaneity is to use a bivariate probit model (biprobit). The 
causal effect in the biprobit model is identified if 𝑍𝑍 significantly affects 𝑀𝑀, and if the 
two error terms follow a bivariate normal distribution (Greene, 2008). However, the 
biprobit model is often less efficient, and does not allow for interactions between 
endogenous regressors and exogenous covariates (Nichols, 2011), restricting its ability 
to detect heterogeneous treatment effects. 
As an alternative, a two-step control function approach can be used (Wooldridge, 2014). 
In the first step, a probit model of the cooperative membership Eq. (1) is estimated with 
𝑋𝑋 and 𝑍𝑍 to obtain the generalized residuals 𝑅𝑅, which are defined as: 
 𝑅𝑅 = 𝑀𝑀𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼1𝑋𝑋 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑍𝑍) − (1 −𝑀𝑀)𝜆𝜆(− 𝛼𝛼1𝑋𝑋 − 𝛼𝛼2𝑍𝑍) (3)   
where 𝜆𝜆(∙) is the inverse Mills ratio. For the probit model, the generalized residuals are 
exactly the inverse Mills ratio (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2016). A Wald test over the joint 
significance of the instruments in Eq. (1) can be performed to test the strength of the 
instruments. In the second step, the obtained generalized residuals 𝑅𝑅 are introduced as 
a regressor in the off-farm employment Eq. (2). 
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂∗ = 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅 + µ (4)   
A probit model of the off-farm employment Eq. (4) including the generalized residuals 
provides consistent estimates of the causal effect of cooperative membership on 
off-farm employment. The probit t-statistics on 𝛽𝛽3  is sufficient to test the null 
hypothesis that membership is exogenous. We follow Abdulai et al. (2011) to test 
over-identification of instruments. Specifically, Eq. (4) is re-estimated with instruments 
included:  
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂∗ = 𝛽𝛽1′𝑋𝑋 + 𝛽𝛽2′𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽3′𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽4′Z + µ (5)   
If 𝛽𝛽4′ are jointly not different from zero, instruments 𝑍𝑍 can be excluded from Eq. (4). 
In the paper, we report the results from the control function. Results from the bivariate 
are provided in the appendix as a benchmark. To address possible correlation of errors, 
we cluster standard errors at the village level. 
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3.3.3 Variable Definition 
We study a number of exogenous factors that could drive households’ participation in 
land markets and off-farm employment. Table 3.1 describes the variables and presents 
summary statistics. We include household heads’ age, gender and education in the 
model. A dummy to indicate household head’s off-farm employment experience before 
cooperative initiation in the village is introduced. We expect a positive effect of this 
variable in both equations, because farmers with previous off-farm experience are more 
likely to transfer land and to keep their off-farm employment or to start new off-farm 
employment. We introduce land area per adult to capture household land endowment. 
Large land endowments are expected to increase households’ probability of cooperative 
membership and to decrease households’ probability of having off-farm employment, 
because more agricultural labor would be needed to farm more land. 
The number of land plots households own is introduced to control the degree of land 
fragmentation. Fragmented land decreases the propensity of off-farm employment (Yan 
et al., 2014) while it increases the propensity to transfer land. Household labor 
availability also has an impact on household labor and land allocation. Family size and 
household dependency ratio represent household labor availability (Feng and Heerink, 
2008). We define the ratio of the number of family members who are older than 65 years 
or younger than 15 years to the family size as household dependency ratio. A low wealth 
level may exclude farmers from land cooperatives and off-farm employment because the 
entry of off-farm employment may require a minimum level of assets (Atamanov and 
van den Berg, 2012). We use the number of main durable assets, such as houses and cars 
as an indicator of wealth (Feng and Heerink, 2008). 
Social networks, i.e. political and labor networks, help households to access job market 
information or to seize opportunities for employment (Yao, 1999; Kung and Lee, 2001). 
Earlier studies find that having a political cadre in the family (Zhang and Li, 2003; 
Zhang et al., 2012) or the more number of early migrators (Zhao, 2003) increase the 
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family members’ off-farm employment. We use communist party membership and the 
number of other family members who worked off-farm as proxies for social networks. 
In addition, social networks may increase households’ access to policy and drive them to 
participate in land cooperatives. Distance to town and a city dummy are introduced to 
control for location effects. Earlier studies show that village location is important to the 
amount of land dedicated to land cooperatives (Liu et al., 2016) and households’ 
off-farm employment (Jonasson and Helfand, 2010). 
Table 3.1 Variable Description and Summary Statistics (N = 545) 
Variable Description Mean S.D. 
Dependent Variables 
Off-farm employment = 1 if the household head has off-farm employment; 0 
= otherwise 
0.626 - 
Membership = 1 if the household is a cooperative member; 0 = 
otherwise 
0.703 - 
Independent variables 
Household head age Age of the household head (years) 61.01 10.19 
Male household head = 1 if the household head is male; 0 = otherwise 0.96 - 
Household head education Years of schooling of the household head (years) 7.024 3.355 
Household head off-farm 
experience 
= 1 if the household head had off-farm employment 
before the program; 0 = otherwise 
0.626 - 
Land area per adult Area of land per adult (over 15 years old) in Mu 1.298 0.821 
Number of land plots Number of land plots the household owns 2.081 1.333 
Family size Number of family members 3.936 1.575 
Dependency ratio The number aged over 65 or below 15 divided by 
family size 
0.349 0.314 
Asset level The number of houses or cars the household owns 1.741 0.904 
Party membership = 1 if the household has communist party member(s); 
0 = otherwise 
0.314 - 
Labor network Number of other family members with off-farm 
employment before cooperative initiation 
1.440 1.112 
Distance to town Distance to town (km) 6.542 4.522 
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Average household 
landholding 
Average household landholding in the village (Mu) 3.307 2.073 
Average plot number per 
household 
Average plot number per household in the village 
before cooperative initiation (mu) 
2.853 1.327 
Time since cooperative 
initiation 
Time since cooperative initiation (years) 4.018 1.713 
Village cadre as cooperative 
leader 
= 1 if the cooperative director is a village cadre; 0 = 
otherwise  
0.914 - 
Suzhou = 1 if the household is from Suzhou; 0 = otherwise 0.639 - 
Source: Authors’ computation 
 
We introduce four village level variables as potential instruments of cooperative 
membership, namely a village’s average number of plots per household, a village’s 
average landholding per household, the time since the start of the cooperative, and a 
dummy variable indicating if the cooperative leader is a village cadre. These variables 
should have no direct effect on individuals’ off-farm employment. Liu et al. (2016) 
show that a low average land endowment in a village, high land fragmentation, and 
strong cooperative leadership can explain the relative amount of land transferred to 
cooperatives at the village level. The longer the cooperative exists in the village, the 
more likely households participate.  
To increase the power of instruments, we introduce the average level of participation in 
a village as an additional instrument. It is defined as the mean of the other households’ 
participation in the same village and assumed to correlate with individuals’ participation, 
because many people are conditional cooperators, i.e., they cooperate if others do 
(Fischbacher et al., 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004). Because lands in cooperatives are 
restricted for agricultural use and no new off-farm opportunity will be created on them, 
average participation should not directly affect individuals’ off-farm employment. The 
use of village means of the endogenous variables as instruments has also been used in 
other studies (Kung, 2002; Rao et al., 2017). 
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3.4 Results 
In this section, we first present the results for the full sample. Then, we discuss potential 
heterogeneity in the effects of cooperative membership by estimating models for 
different subgroups of the sample. 
3.4.1 Results for the Full Sample 
Table 3.2 shows household heads’ off-farm employment, disaggregated by cooperative 
membership. In the sample, 383 households (= 70.3%) participate in land cooperatives, 
whereas 162 households (= 29.7%) do not participate. 341 household heads (= 62.6%) 
have off-farm employment, in contrast to 204 (= 37.4%) that do not. The proportion of 
household heads with off-farm employment in households with cooperative 
membership (265 out of 383) is much higher than that of households without 
cooperative membership (76 out of 162), implying some interdependence of off-farm 
employment and land transfer to land cooperatives. 
Table 3.2 Frequency of Cooperative Membership and Off-farm Employment 
Off-farm employment 
Cooperative membership 
No Yes Total 
No 86 118 204 
Yes 76 265 341 
Total 162 383 545 
Source: Authors’ computation 
 
Table 3.3 presents the main estimation results. Although only the average participation 
level is individually statistically significant, the F-statistic for the test of the joint 
significance of instruments suggests that they can explain cooperative membership. The 
F-statistic for the test of overidentification fails to reject the exclusion restriction that 
the instruments affect off-farm employment only via cooperative membership. The 
generalized residual shows no statistical significance, indicating no simultaneity bias, 
i.e., estimates are consistent (Abdulai et al., 2011). 
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Table 3.3 Determinants of Cooperative Membership and Off-farm Employment (Full Sample) 
Variables Membership   Off-farm 
Membership    0.103 (0.073) 
Household head age -0.000 (0.002)   -0.010*** (0.002) 
Male household head -0.032 (0.077)   0.166 (0.116) 
Household head education 0.006 (0.004)   0.000 (0.004) 
Household head off-farm experience 0.054** (0.027) 
 
0.346*** (0.017) 
Land area per adult 0.070*** (0.025) 
 
0.009 (0.022) 
Number of land plots 0.018 (0.017)   0.011 (0.013) 
Family size 0.012 (0.012)   0.016 (0.011) 
Dependency ratio -0.013 (0.051)   -0.048 (0.057) 
Asset level -0.003 (0.018)   0.016 (0.015) 
Party membership 0.045 (0.030)   0.074** (0.032) 
Labor network -0.005 (0.018)   -0.015 (0.021) 
Distance to town 0.003* (0.002) 
 
0.002 (0.003) 
Suzhou 0.103*** (0.039) 
 
0.066 (0.054) 
Average plot number per household 0.002 (0.008)   
  
Average household landholding -0.004 (0.007)   
  
Time since cooperative initiation 0.001 (0.004)     
Village cadre as cooperative leader 0.041 (0.025)   
  
Group average of participation 0.499*** (0.036) 
 
  
Generalized residuals    -0.039 (0.051) 
Pseudo R2 0.449     0.437   
Observations 545     545   
Notes: 
a. The table reports average marginal effects. Delta method standard errors are in the parentheses. 
b. The F-statistic for joint significance of instruments is 131.83 (P-value = 0.000). 
c. The F-statistic for overidentification is 7.190 (P-value = 0.207). 
d. The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate a significance level 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
We first look at the cooperative equation. In line with our expectations, we find that 
households are 5.4 percent more likely to join land cooperatives if household heads had 
off-farm before the start of the cooperative. This result is consistent with previous 
studies that households with off-farm employment are more likely to transfer land 
because land and labor are typically complements (Yao, 2000; Huang et al., 2012). Land 
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endowment shows a statistically significant and positive, albeit modest, effect (of 
approximately seven percent) on cooperative membership, which is also consistent with 
an earlier study (Rahman, 2010). Because the value of land decreases with distance 
from town, households in remote villages should be more likely to transfer land to 
cooperatives (Liu et al., 2016). However, in our estimates the effect of distance to town 
is only small, albeit positive and significant at the 10% level. The city dummy shows a 
significant and positive effect. Households in Suzhou are 10.3 percent more likely to 
participate in cooperatives than those in Yangzhou which may be driven by additional 
government subsidies in Suzhou. 
In the off-farm equation we find that – in spite of the positive correlation (cf. Table 3.2) 
– cooperative membership has no statistically significant effect on household heads’ 
current off-farm employment. Long et al. (2010) argue that because of strong barriers to 
labor migration in China land consolidation programs may not necessarily increase 
off-farm employment. 
Household heads’ age has a significant, negative, but small effect on current off-farm 
employment, probably because China’s off-farm employment opportunities are often 
physically demanding and favor young adults (Uchida et al., 2009). Household heads’ 
previous off-farm experience shows a significant and positive effect. With 39.9 percent, 
the average marginal effect is very large. Farmers who have previously worked off-farm 
might simply have continued their jobs. Community level party membership is 
statistically significant and positive with a magnitude of 7.4 percent, consistent with 
previous research showing that households with cadres have better job market prospects 
in China (Zhang and Li, 2003). 
3.4.2 Heterogeneity 
We explore other explanations for the lack of an effect of cooperative membership on 
off-farm employment. One reason may be heterogeneity in the sample that is related to 
the treatment effect. For instance, heterogeneity in agricultural human capital may 
interact with treatment. In the presence of land cooperatives, households may 
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increasingly specialize and adopt contrasting land and labor decisions (Yao, 2000). 
Some households may seek more off-farm employment, whereas others would 
specialize in agriculture, renting more land and giving up off-form employment. In 
other words, what may look like an effect of zero, may be opposing effects in a 
heterogeneous population. We first explore this possibility by dropping households from 
the sample which have rented land from the cooperative. Because this sub-sample is 
rather small (only 32 observations), the results do not change substantially. 
Households may also be heterogeneous with respect to the availability of surplus 
agricultural labor. We split the sample by the number of adults in the family who did not 
have off-farm employment before the land cooperative program. We call households 
with two or more family members without off-farm experience constrained. Otherwise, 
they are defined as unconstrained. Given the small land endowment in the study area, 
two or more family members without off-farm employment are a good indicator of 
surplus agricultural labor. We provide estimates for each sub-sample (Table 3.4). We 
remove the variable labor network from the model because of its high correlation with 
the measure that defines the two subgroups. All tests related to the quality of 
instruments perform well.  
Table 3.4 shows significant differences between the two sub-samples. Household heads’ 
off-farm experience becomes statistically insignificant in the cooperative membership 
equation for the constrained group. One specific person’s off-farm employment is less 
important to cooperative membership if the household had many people without 
off-farm employment. The effect of household land endowment remains positive, 
though its statistical significance drops to nearly ten percent. The effect of family size 
on cooperative membership becomes positive and significant for the constrained group. 
This is in contrast to an earlier study showing that an increase in family size increases 
agricultural labor and thus should negatively affect land transfer (Zhang et al., 2004). 
However, the number of agricultural laborers might already have been adequately 
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captured by splitting the sample. Family size may then rather reflect the increase of 
family members employed in the off-farm sector, which might show a positive effect on 
membership in the cooperative. Consistent with the earlier finding that local elites are 
often more engaged in collective action (Platteau et al., 2014), the effect of party 
membership for the constrained group is significant and positive. 
Another difference in the cooperative membership equation is observed for village 
characteristics in unconstrained households. We find that the effect of distance to town 
becomes zero for the unconstrained group. The value of land might play only a minor 
role who has worked off-farm for a long time. In line with earlier findings (Chen, 2015; 
Liu et al., 2016), average plot number per household in the village and cooperative 
leadership show a significant and positive effect. 
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Table 3.4 Determinants of Cooperative Membership and Off-farm Employment (Sub Samples) 
Variables 
Unconstrained households   Constrained households 
Membership 
 
Off-farm   Membership 
 
Off-farm  
Membership    -0.013 (0.089)       0.212** (0.087) 
Household head age 0.003 (0.002)  -0.014*** (0.004)   -0.002 (0.002)  -0.009*** (0.003) 
Male household head -0.060 (0.097) 
 
0.253** (0.121)   -0.028 (0.093) 
 
0.123 (0.146) 
Household head education 0.007 (0.006) 
 
0.003 (0.007)   0.005 (0.006) 
 
-0.004 (0.006) 
Household head off-farm experience 0.144** (0.060) 
 
0.295*** (0.068)   0.021 (0.042) 
 
0.399*** (0.032) 
Land area per adult 0.061 (0.039) 
 
-0.020 (0.032)   0.086** (0.035) 
 
0.012 (0.027) 
Number of land plots 0.025 (0.023) 
 
0.007 (0.018)   0.015 (0.019) 
 
0.018 (0.016) 
Family size -0.011 (0.017) 
 
-0.002 (0.016)   0.028** (0.013)   0.010 (0.016) 
Dependency ratio 0.027 (0.055) 
 
-0.058 (0.080)   -0.070 (0.077) 
 
0.067 (0.099) 
Asset level 0.033 (0.034) 
 
-0.024 (0.033)   -0.017 (0.023) 
 
0.048* (0.026) 
Party membership -0.019 (0.051) 
 
0.128*** (0.043)   0.066* (0.037) 
 
0.040 (0.043) 
Distance to town -0.004 (0.004) 
 
0.009 (0.006)   0.006** (0.003) 
 
-0.004 (0.003) 
Suzhou 0.131* (0.079) 
 
0.119** (0.063)   0.126* (0.069) 
 
-0.016 (0.069) 
Average household landholding 0.025 (0.016) 
 
    -0.013 (0.010) 
 
  
Average plot number per household 0.030** (0.015) 
 
    -0.017 (0.016) 
 
  
Time since cooperative initiation 0.008 (0.011) 
 
    0.001 (0.006) 
 
  
Village cadre as cooperative leader 0.118** (0.052) 
 
    0.024 (0.041) 
 
  
Group average of participation 0.459*** (0.077) 
 
    0.536*** (0.072) 
 
  
Generalized residuals    0.076 (0.058)      
 
-0.114* (0.065) 
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Pseudo R2 0.4372     0.366    0.4947   0.486  
Observations 248     248    297     297  
Notes: 
a. Households with one or no agricultural laborer before the start of the cooperative fall into the unconstrained group. Otherwise, they fall into the constrained 
group. 
b. The table reports average marginal effect. Delta-method standard errors are in the parentheses. 
c. The F-statistic for joint significance of instruments for unconstrained and constrained households is 51.44 (P-value = 0.000) and 58.55 (P-value = 0. 000), 
respectively. 
d. The F-statistic for overidentification for unconstrained and constrained households is 6.02 (P-value = 0.304) and 7.00 (P-value = 0.221), respectively. 
e. The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate a significance level 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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We also find some differences for the two groups in the effect of cooperative 
membership on household heads’ current off-farm employment in the off-farm 
employment equation. Specifically, cooperative membership remains insignificant for 
the unconstrained group, but becomes significant and positive for the constrained group. 
The marginal effect of cooperative membership on off-farm employment for the 
constrained group is 21.2 percent. This is in line with our theoretical analysis. 
Unconstrained households may have decided on labor allocation before land 
cooperatives were introduced. With the establishment of land cooperatives, households 
have transferred their land without re-allocating labor. However, for the constrained 
group land cooperatives have affected labor allocation. 
Similar to the full sample, male household heads have a positive effect in both 
subgroups, although the effect is statistically significant only for the unconstrained 
group. Male household heads are 25.3 percent more likely to have off-farm employment 
than females in the unconstrained sub-sample. A household’s assets have a positive 
effect in the constrained group. Previous research has shown that initial wealth is 
important to facilitate off-farm employment (Atamanov and van den Berg, 2012). While 
party membership remains statistically significant for the unconstrained group, it 
becomes insignificant for the constrained group. The city dummy has a significant effect 
only for the unconstrained group. The more developed city Suzhou may provide more 
off-farm employment opportunities. However, for constrained households such 
opportunities may not translate into actual off-farm employment. 
The differences in the causal effect of cooperative membership on household heads’ 
off-farm employment between the constrained and unconstrained groups raises two 
additional questions. First, because household heads with off-farm employment 
experience are less likely to fall into the constrained group, does the effect mainly stem 
from household heads without prior off-farm employment experience? Second, because 
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Suzhou is more developed and offered better opportunities for off-farm employment in 
the past, households in Suzhou are also less likely to fall into the constrained group. We 
may thus ask if the effect is larger in Yangzhou. 
Table 3.5 Marginal Effect for Cooperative Membership at Representative Values 
Variables Interactive effect model I 
 
Interactive effect model II 
Cooperative membership  (Off-farm 
experience = 1) 
0.071 (0.092)    
Cooperative membership  (Off-farm 
experience = 0) 
0.203** (0.102)    
Cooperative membership  (Suzhou = 1)    0.074 (0.090) 
Cooperative membership  (Suzhou = 0)    0.141 (0.087) 
Note: 
a. The table reports average marginal effect. Delta-method standard errors are in the parentheses 
b. The asterisk ** indicates a significance level of 5%. 
 
To investigate these questions, we introduce an interaction terms between cooperative 
membership and household heads’ off-farm experience, cooperative membership and 
the city dummy in Eq. (4). We then calculate the marginal effect of cooperative 
membership on household heads’ current off-farm employment by varying the variables 
for household heads’ off-farm experience and the city dummy at different values. 
Results are reported in Table 3.5. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the 
causal effect of cooperative membership on off-farm employment is only significant if 
household heads had no prior off-farm employment experience. The effect is also larger 
in Yangzhou (with statistical significance close to the 10% level). 
3.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
We used several tests to examine the sensitivity of our results. First, we estimated three 
standard probit models for Eq. (2), ignoring the potential endogeneity issue. While the 
results with the full sample and the unconstrained sample are generally consistent with 
our results, there is a large change in the effect of cooperative membership on household 
heads’ off-farm employment for the constrained group, indicating a bias if the 
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endogeneity is not adequately dealt with.  
Second, we re-estimate the control function estimator, using village average 
participation level as the only instrument. As shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, the four 
village level instruments show only a small effect on cooperative membership for the 
full and constrained sample, which raises the concern of weak instruments and biased 
estimates. Third, we estimate the bivariate probit model, as demonstrated in the 
estimation strategy section. Score tests proposed by Murphy (2007) suggest that the null 
hypothesis of bivariate normally distributed error terms cannot be rejected, suggesting 
that the models are correctly specified. Results are reported in Table A 3- 1and Table A 
3- 2. Fourth, we use a “plug-in” approach which often complements the control function 
approach to test the robustness of our results. The “plug-in” approach estimates a probit 
model for Eq. (2) by replacing 𝑀𝑀 with probit fitted values 𝑀𝑀�  from Eq. (1). With all 
the approaches our initial results are qualitatively reproduced. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Despite the rapidly growing economy, rural land markets remain underdeveloped in 
rural China. As a consequence, a large share of the labor force is still employed in 
agriculture. To release surplus agricultural labor, China’s land cooperative program 
seeks to increase efficiency in land markets by consolidating scattered agricultural land. 
In this paper, we have analyzed the drivers of households’ membership in land 
cooperatives and the impact of cooperative membership on labor reallocation. We found 
that cooperative membership has a positive effect on household heads’ off-farm 
employment only for a sub-group of our sample. Households with surplus labor 
benefited most from the land cooperative program. Households in this group were 
approximately 20 percent more likely to have off-farm employment. Further analysis 
has shown that this effect is also pronounced for household heads without prior off-farm 
employment and households located in Yangzhou. 
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The heterogeneous treatment effects show that households use different strategies in 
dealing with the possibility to join a land cooperative. For households without surplus 
agricultural labor, working off-farm was not restricted by the access to land markets. 
Households in this group might have just entrusted their unfarmed land to relatives for 
low or no rents – a practice which for a long time was quite common in rural China 
(Kung, 2002). Here, we have only looked at the impact of membership on off-farm 
employment. It remains to be seen how much – if at all – these households would 
benefit from the program in other respects.  
For households with surplus agricultural labor, access to land markets affects 
households’ labor market decisions. Without access to efficient land markets, the gain 
from off-farm employment would have been too small. To stay in agriculture was an 
optimal decision before the land cooperative program. The stable land income from the 
cooperative is an improvement over the small compensations received from relatives in 
earlier times (Chen, 2015). Land cooperatives also improved households’ property 
rights over land (Ito et al., 2016) which – as we have shown – will have a positive effect 
on transfers and off-farm employment. 
In general, our results show that land cooperatives are effective in stimulating land 
transfers. For a large group of the sample, there are also consequences for labor market 
decision-making. In some instances, local authorities have been reported to put pressure 
on households to join the cooperative and to transfer land (Chen, 2015). It is apparently 
difficult to gather reliable data on this issue. Not accounting for the phenomenon may 
bias the estimates. If people are forced to participate in land cooperatives, there might 
not be a positive welfare effect from the program. Households will adjust their strategies 
under the constraint of losing land to the cooperative. Although households would still 
choose the best strategy, the overall welfare effects might be negative. Off-farm 
employment could then be the better among two worse alternatives. More research is 
needed to further investigate the issue of autonomy and welfare effects in land 
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cooperatives. 
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Abstract: Members’ participation in decision-making is a critical part of resource 
co-management. However, little is known about the welfare consequences of 
participation. This paper analyzes the impact of members’ participation in 
decision-making on the income from cooperatives, using data from 364 members from 
China’s land cooperative program. We distinguish two levels of participation in 
decision-making, voting and obtaining financial information. We use a bivariate probit 
model and propensity score matching to estimate the impact. The results indicate that 
household heads’ age, gender and education, family size, wealth, and political 
affiliation determine participation in decision-making. Participation in either voting or 
obtaining financial information has a positive impact on members’ land income. There 
is also a strong joint effect of voting and obtaining information with an increase in land 
income of more than 16 percent. We conclude that broad participation can ensure more 
equitable access to land income for members. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Over the past thirty years, policies and programs in natural resource management have 
developed towards co-management in developing countries across the globe (Agrawal 
and Ostrom, 2001; Mansuri and Rao, 2012; Persha and Andersson, 2014), with the key 
objective of decentralizing decision-making (Baynes et al., 2015). Generally, 
co-management requires resource users to actively participate in decisions on the use 
of natural resources (Behera, 2009). By including local people in decision-making 
processes, co-management programs overcome information asymmetries commonly 
found in top-down approaches. It also allows for the integration of local and 
indigenous knowledge in resource management (Blaikie, 2006; Dasgupta and Beard, 
2007). In addition, co-management programs often aim at an equitable benefit 
distribution from resource use and may generally provide a more sustainable way to 
manage natural resources (Agrawal, 2001; Adhikari et al., 2004; Tachibana and 
Adhikari, 2009). 
Despite its popularity, co-management often fails to achieve its objectives, particularly 
in terms of the devolution of decision-making (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; 
Mansuri and Rao, 2012). Decision-making processes are often captured by local elites 
(Saito-Jensen et al., 2010; Lund and Saito-Jensen, 2013), and less affluent households 
have little voice in these processes (Mansuri and Rao, 2012; Thondhlana et al., 2015), 
casting doubt on the inclusiveness of decision-making in co-management programs. A 
lack of inclusiveness in decision-making prevents that all people’s preferences are 
adequately reflected in the institutional setup and operation of co-management 
programs. The access to benefits then critically depends on decisions made by people 
who control the program (Bardhan, 2002).  
Although earlier studies investigated benefit distribution between elites and non-elites 
in co-management programs, there is to date limited knowledge on the question to 
what extent, engagement in decision-making processes can affect the program 
members’ benefits. Empirical studies show that in some cases, elites who control 
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decision-making processes act in their own interests and, as a consequence, benefit 
disproportionally (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Kamoto et al., 2013). In other cases, 
however, benefits are distributed more evenly – even in the presence of elite control 
(Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007). More recent studies have investigated the 
welfare effects of membership in co-management programs, implicitly assuming that 
households take an active part in co-management activities (Jumbe and Angelsen, 2006; 
Mazunda and Shively, 2015; Rahut et al., 2015). Active participation is often 
operationalized by investigating attendance rates in meetings (Prokopy, 2009) or the 
occupation of posts in the organization (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). However, it has 
been recognized that not all members in co-management programs attend meetings and 
that those who do may not necessarily be involved in decision-making (Chhetri et al., 
2013; Lestari et al., 2015).  
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of members’ participation in 
decision-making on their income from co-management. We develop a new approach to 
participation in co-management for resource management. Specifically, we argue that 
one must distinguish between different levels of involvement in the organization. First, 
members may control the fate of their organization by taking part in elections, for 
instance, if leaders are selected. Second, members may choose different levels of effort 
when gathering information about important developments concerning the organization 
(Fritzen, 2007). We provide here the first quantitative analysis on the benefits of 
members obtained from a co-management program that distinguishes between different 
levels of engagement. Doing so will enhance our understanding of collective action in 
natural resource management, explicitly acknowledging the demand for greater 
inclusiveness in co-management (Prokopy, 2005; Li et al., 2014).  
In our empirical analysis, we focus on the land cooperative program, a policy for the 
co-management of community-owned agricultural land in China. While there are many 
studies focusing on co-management in Africa or South Asia (Dasgupta and Beard, 
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2007; Fritzen, 2007; Mansuri and Rao, 2012; Kamoto et al., 2013), few studies have 
dealt with China. The land cooperative program is popular in eastern China, 
particularly in Jiangsu Province, where our study is located. Unlike co-management 
programs that evolve from a top-down governance approach in other countries 
(Mansuri and Rao, 2012; Ayers and Kittinger, 2014), the land cooperative program 
evolved from the household responsibility system under which land resources have 
been managed de facto freely by villagers for many years. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section two introduces the land cooperative 
program in China and develops a theoretical framework on the causal channels of 
participation in decision-making on land income. Section three describes our data 
collection and empirical strategy. Section four presents the results, followed by a 
discussion in section five, and a conclusion and policy implications in section six. 
4.2 Background and Context 
4.2.1 The Land Cooperative Program 
Since the 1970s, rural land in China has been managed under the household 
responsibility system. Ever since, farm households have been able to contract with 
village committees for agricultural land, which was primarily distributed according to 
household size, labor availability or both in the family. Households were free to 
cultivate the land they received and could retain land revenues, as long as they paid 
taxes and grain quotas to the government. Such tax and grain quota delivery 
obligations, however, were removed nationwide in 2006. Earlier, contracts had a 
duration of 15 years and then were extended to 30 years. In 2008, a document from the 
central government explicitly stated that the contracting relationship should be stable 
and unchanged for permanence and a land market should be encouraged (CCCPC, 
2008). In this sense, land distributed under the household responsibility system can be 
seen as de facto private property. 
Although the household responsibility system has substantially contributed to rural and 
 79 
 
economic development in China (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004), repeating land 
adjustment according to changes in family size and labor availability to achieve 
egalitarian land distribution has led to land fragmentation (Tan et al., 2006). Land 
fragmentation continues to be a problem because of the poorly developed land markets. 
Until 2006, in Jiangsu Province, one of the most developed areas in the market 
economy in China, less than 10% of the agricultural land had been rented in the market 
(Liu et al., 2017). Meanwhile, rapid industrialization and urbanization have provided 
many employment opportunities in the urban sector, allowing for labor migration and 
the consolidation of agricultural land. A key objective of the land cooperative program 
is therefore to consolidate fragmented land, with a particular emphasis on efficiency 
gains and large-scale commercial farming. 
The land cooperative program started in the 1990s in Guangdong Province. In 2002, it 
spread to Jiangsu Province and has been widely practiced after the introduction of the 
cooperative law in 2007. Under the land cooperative program, villages are free to 
establish land cooperatives that fulfill the function of local land markets (Ho and Lin, 
2003; Chen, 2015). Households who want to quit farming can transfer land to the 
cooperative and become members of the cooperative. The cooperative consolidates the 
land by hiring farm employees to cultivate the land or by leasing the land to farmers 
who bid the highest price (Liu et al., 2016). 
The land cooperative program embraces co-management principles, i.e., it encourages 
the active participation of members in decision-making (Chen, 2015). According to the 
Regulations of Jiangsu Province on Specialized Farmers’ Cooperatives (2009), major 
decisions must be made jointly by members in regular meetings. Decisions concern, 
for instance, the revision of by-laws and regulations and the selection of managers, 
board members, and member representatives. Large land cooperatives have the 
opportunity to delegate authority to representatives (elected by a general assembly) 
who will act on behalf of all members. In addition, the distribution of revenues among 
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members is decided upon in meetings. At least once a year, meetings will also report 
on the financial performance. Both the distribution of revenues and financial 
information are made available to members via booklets or posters at the office of the 
cooperative. Members then have the opportunity to obtain such information by visiting 
the office of the cooperative. 
In exchange for land, cooperative members receive land income as land rent and 
dividend (Chen, 2015). Land rent per mu (a Chinese unit of area, in which one mu 
equals 0.07 hectare) is a fixed income component regardless of the profitability of land 
cooperatives. It guarantees a minimum land income for households. A dividend is a 
variable income component determined by a cooperative’s profit and the shares a 
household owns in the cooperative (Tian and Zhu, 2013). Typically, one mu of land is 
exchanged for one share. However, the exchange rate may be adjusted by various 
factors. For example, Yep (2015) shows that larger households or households with 
fewer old and young members often receive more shares. Such exchange rules 
undermine the transparency of the exchange processes, because ordinary members 
cannot keep track of everyone else’s land area or demographic characteristics. The 
exchange process and the follow-up dividend distribution can therefore be described as 
a black box from the member’s perspective that is under the control of cooperative 
leaders or member representatives. Our field survey indicates that households often 
cannot distinguish land rent and dividend. In addition, they do not know how many 
shares they own in the cooperative, which makes it easy for cooperative power holders 
to manipulate the dividend distribution. 
4.2.2 Impact of Participation in Decision-making on Land Income 
Democratic governance can be partially or entirely undermined by existing power 
holders (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Households who have power in 
co-management programs may capture benefits at the expense of others (Pérez-Cirera 
and Lovett, 2006). In the land cooperative program, only a small proportion of 
members have actively participated in decision-making processes, and different levels 
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of engagement might exist. Following Fritzen (2007), we distinguish between (1) 
participation in elections, including the revision of by-laws and regulations or the 
selection of board members and representatives (hereafter VOTE), and (2) obtaining 
cooperative’s financial information (hereafter INFORMATION). We now consider 
how participation in the two levels of engagement in decision-making can affect the 
land income received from the cooperative. 
The access to benefits may be affected by VOTE if there is room for manipulation in 
the process. Mansuri and Rao (2004) show that transparency in decision-making is 
necessary for achieving fair benefit distribution. In the land cooperative program, the 
exchange process of land to shares and the distribution of variable dividends are under 
the control of cooperative leaders or member representatives. To stay in the leadership 
position, the selected program leaders or representatives represent the interest of active 
members, i.e., those who participated in elections (Labonne and Chase, 2009). They 
may manipulate the dividend distribution in favor of their electorate, either by setting a 
higher exchange rate of land to shares or by paying higher dividends per share. In 
addition, INFORMATION may affect a member’s land income. On the one hand, 
information asymmetries may explain rent-seeking activities in resource 
co-management (Behera and Engel, 2006). On the other hand, rather than being 
passive recipients, beneficiaries often bargain with those in charge of distributing 
benefits to secure greater shares, particularly if they possess relevant financial 
information (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). In contrast, beneficiaries who lack 
important information tend to accept offers without renegotiating. Thus, we expect a 
positive impact of participation in INFORMATION on the land income received by 
cooperative members. 
There may also be a joint effect of VOTE and INFORMATION. Olken (2007) 
demonstrates that elite capture, in particular, occurs if a program’s financial 
information can be more easily accessed by beneficiaries with personal ties to program 
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leaders. Leaders will redistribute benefits in favor of beneficiaries who are close to 
them and who have better access to financial information. In the same vein, leaders 
may not fear protest from members who do not know about the financial information 
of the cooperative if these members do not participate in voting. Applying these 
arguments, we expect a positive joint effect of VOTE and INFORMATION on land 
income received by cooperative members. 
4.3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
4.3.1 Data Collection 
We use data from a household survey conducted in 2014 in two cities of Jiangsu 
Province, namely, Suzhou and Yangzhou. The two cities have the highest number of 
registered land cooperatives, and Jiangsu Province is representative of the developed 
areas of coastal China, where the land cooperative program has reached large coverage 
(Tian and Zhu, 2013). Relative to other income sources, household income from 
agricultural land is relatively low in Jiangsu Province. However, particularly for poor 
households, it remains an important component of total household income (Liu et al., 
2016). 
From a list of all villages with land cooperatives in the province, we randomly selected 
60 villages from Suzhou and Yangzhou. In each village, we sampled on average ten 
households, using the random walk technique. Households that did not participate in 
the land cooperative program at the time of data collection were excluded from the 
dataset, leading to a total of 364 households used for analysis. A team of undergraduate 
and graduate students from Nanjing Agricultural University was trained to conduct 
face-to-face interviews. Household heads or other knowledgeable household members 
were interviewed. We used a structured questionnaire that asked for detailed 
information on household members’ demographic characteristics, communist party 
affiliation, land endowments, other assets, cooperative membership and income, and 
participation in the cooperative’s decision-making process. 
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4.3.2 Empirical Strategy 
We are interested in the effect of participating in elections (VOTE) and obtaining 
information (INFORMATION). Members decide on their level of participation in 
decision-making in the cooperative, and this decision may be driven by a number of 
factors, i.e., it is not random. To estimate the causal effects of decision-making on 
income, we need to construct an appropriate counterfactual, which can be achieved by 
propensity score matching (PSM).12 PSM assumes that the selection into treatment is 
based on observed exogenous factors and avoids the restrictions on model 
specifications for the relationship between outcome and predictors of outcome 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). It has been demonstrated that PSM yields results that 
resemble randomized assignment to treatment, commonly known from experimental 
designs (Smith and Todd, 2005; Abadie and Imbens, 2006). The idea of PSM is to 
estimate a selection function from which “statistical twins” are matched based on the 
estimated probability for selection into treatment. Typically, PSM uses logit or probit 
models to estimate the probability of selecting into binary treatments. However, if 
there is more than one treatment, other models are needed to estimate the selection 
function, particularly in the presence of correlation between treatments. 
Lechner (2002) and Gerfin and Lechner (2002) propose a multinomial logit model to 
estimate the propensity score of treatments against non-treatment when there are 
several mutually exclusive treatments. If there are two treatments that are not mutually 
exclusive, Prokopy (2009) suggests a bivariate probit model for estimating the 
treatment effect before performing PSM. In this paper, we use the bivariate probit 
model for estimating the determinants of the two treatments. Unlike Prokopy (2009), 
we estimate propensity scores based on the bivariate probit model rather than a 
                                                 
12 For a comparison of different methods to address selection bias, please refer to Ali et al. (2016). 
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standard probit model because the bivariate probit model is preferred for the 
calculation of propensity scores if the error terms are correlated (Becker and Egger, 
2013). We also form four possible combinations of the two treatment variables (as 
shown in Table 4.1) and use an inverse probability weighting estimator with the 
selection function of the multinomial logit model as a robustness test. 
Table 4.1 Sample Distribution in Different Situations 
Decision-making INFORMATION = 1 INFORMATION = 0 Total 
VOTE = 1 Situation One (S1) = 70 Situation Two (S2) = 34 104 
VOTE = 0 Situation Three (S3) = 25 Situation Four (S4) = 235 260 
Total 95 269 364 
Sources: Authors’ computation 
 
The first dependent variable in the selection function VOTE takes the value of one for 
households that participate in voting and zero otherwise. The variable INFORMATION 
takes the value of one for households know about cooperative financial information 
and zero otherwise. Both variables are self-reported by the respondents. Table 4.1 
displays the frequencies of the four possible treatment combinations. The majority of 
households are absent from both VOTE and INFORMATION. Approximately one fifth 
of the sample takes part in both activities, and approximately five to ten percent are 
engaged in one of the two activities. 
(1) Estimating Participation: Bivariate Probit Model 
Following Greene (2008), the resulting bivariate probit model can be defined as:  
𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉∗  =  𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀1;  VOTE =  1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉𝑂𝑂𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉∗ > 0 (1) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼∗  =  𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀2;  INFORMATION =  1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼∗ > 0 (2) 
𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 (𝜀𝜀1, 𝜀𝜀2)  =  𝜌𝜌 (3) 
where VOTE∗ and INFORMATION∗ are latent variables representing the utility of 
participation in VOTE and INFORMATION, respectively. If VOTE∗ exceeds zero, we 
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will observe a household participating in voting. Similarly, if INFORMATION∗ 
exceeds zero, we will observe a household accessing knowledge about the balance of 
payments. The covariance of the error terms ε1 and ε2 is indicated by ρ and takes 
the value of zero if the two decisions are independent, which would mean that the 
standard probit model is sufficient to estimate the determinants of the two decisions. If 
there is correlation, i.e., ρ is significantly different from zero, the bivariate probit 
model is preferred for the estimation of propensity scores.  
(2) Impact Assessment: Propensity Score Matching 
We follow Lechner (2002) in estimating propensity scores from a bivariate probit 
model. Let j denote the decision-making situation in which a cooperative member 
falls (cf. Table 4.1). The probability of participation in each situation is defined as: 
𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗(𝑥𝑥);    𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝐽 = {1,2,3,4} (4) 
The resulting pair-wise propensity scores are computed as: 
𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗(𝑥𝑥)
𝑃𝑃�𝑗𝑗(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥) ;   Δ 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑚𝑚 (5) 
where j and m belong to the situation set J = {1,2,3,4}. They can be an individual 
situation or a combination of situations. P�j|j,m(x)  are the predicted conditional 
propensity scores of a cooperative member participating in situation j  against 
situation m. In this study, we assess the impact of participating in two types of 
decision-making processes – VOTE and INFORMATION – against their counterparts. 
We are also interested in estimating the joint effect of participating in both decisions or 
only in one of the two as opposed to not participating at all. Thus, five types of 
propensity scores are computed. 
𝑃𝑃�1,2|1,2,3,4(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃�1(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�2(𝑥𝑥)
𝑃𝑃�1(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�2(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�3(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�4(𝑥𝑥) (6) 
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𝑃𝑃�1,3|1,2,3,4(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃�1(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�3(𝑥𝑥)
𝑃𝑃�1(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�2(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�3(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�4(𝑥𝑥) (7) 
𝑃𝑃�1|1,4(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃�1(𝑥𝑥)
𝑃𝑃�1(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�4(𝑥𝑥) (8) 
𝑃𝑃�2|2,4(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃�2(𝑥𝑥)
𝑃𝑃�2(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�4(𝑥𝑥) (9) 
𝑃𝑃�3|3,4(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃�3(𝑥𝑥)
𝑃𝑃�3(𝑥𝑥) + 𝑃𝑃�4(𝑥𝑥) (10) 
The average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) after matching can then be estimated 
as: 
𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗|𝑚𝑚 = 𝑉𝑉�𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 − 𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚| 𝐽𝐽 = 𝑗𝑗�;  Δ 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑚𝑚 (11) 
We apply the commonly used nearest neighboring (NN) matching algorithm to form 
statistical twins (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). To increase the quality of matching 
and to decrease possible bias, we restrict matching within common support and allow 
for matching with replacement. We use NN with three matching partners. Weights are 
equally distributed. We use t-tests to identify differences in outcomes between the 
treated units and their matching partners. 
4.3.3 Variables Used in Estimating Propensity Scores 
Generally, variables in the selection function should be simultaneously associated with 
participation and the outcome (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2008) also suggest that selected independent variables must be strictly exogenous and 
unaffected by the participation decisions. The selected variables, therefore, should 
either be measured before participation in the treatment or be time-invariant. Other 
authors argue that variables for estimating propensity scores may also be selected 
following a different set of criteria (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). Most 
studies emphasize the importance of adjusting differences between the treated and 
untreated and use variables that – based on theoretical considerations – are more 
important for selection than for the outcome (Prokopy, 2009; Park and Wang, 2010; 
Mazunda and Shively, 2015; Rahut et al., 2016). Ameha et al. (2014) select variables 
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that are theoretically important for determining the outcome. In line with previous 
studies (Prokopy, 2009; Park and Wang, 2010; Mazunda and Shively, 2015), we base 
our selection function on variables that predominately affect participation rather than 
the outcome. 
We use the variables shown in Table 4.2 in the selection function. We control for 
household heads’ age, gender and education. Households with young, male and 
educated household heads are more likely to participate in co-management (Rahut et 
al., 2015). Household size and dependency ratio serve as indicators of labor 
availability (Prokopy, 2009; Liu et al., 2016). Households with surplus labor are more 
likely to participate in co-management activities (Prokopy and Thorsten, 2008; 
Prokopy, 2009). We add the area of land transferred to the land cooperative program to 
the selection function, and we expect a positive effect on households’ participation in 
decision-making. The more land a household has transferred, the more important it is 
to secure a high land income and to influence the decision-making. Arguably, 
households decide how much land they would like to transfer first. Hence, the variable 
is exogenous to the participation decision.  
Table 4.2 Variables Used in the Selection Function 
Variables Description 
Age Age of the household head (years) 
Male  = 1 if the household head is male; otherwise = 0 
Education Years of schooling of the household head (years) 
Family size Number of family members 
Dependency ratio The number of family members older than 65 or younger than 15 divided by 
family size 
Land area Land area the household transferred to the land cooperative program (mu) 
Asset The number of houses and cars the household owns 
Party membership  = 1 if the household has communist party member(s); otherwise = 0 
Distance town Distance to town (km) 
Suzhou  = 1 if the household is from Suzhou; otherwise = 0 
Note：Authors’ computation 
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We also introduce a household’s assets and communist party membership to the 
selection function. Case study research has shown that wealthy households and 
households with political ties have more power to influence decisions in their interest 
(Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Mansuri and Rao, 2012). For instance, Prokopy (2009) 
finds that households with more assets are more likely to attend collective meetings, 
and Vargas et al. (2016) shows that traditional leaders tend to talk longer in group 
discussions on public matters. We use the number of key assets, such as cars and 
houses, as an indicator of wealth in rural China (Feng et al., 2010).  
We also add the locational information, such as distance to town and city, in the 
selection function. The impact of distance to town on participation is twofold. On the 
one hand, households close to the town could be less interested in participation due to 
the greater availability of non-agricultural income opportunities. On the other hand, 
households in areas close to urban centers may show more interest in participation due 
to the better access to policy information (Gelo and Koch, 2014). Moreover, the 
distance to town also affects the land value and as a consequence the cooperative’s 
income. The city dummy is introduced to control for regional differences. Land is on 
average more valuable in Suzhou than in Yangzhou. In addition, Suzhou provides 
financial support for forming cooperatives under the land cooperative program (Liu et 
al., 2016), which may also increase the land income in the city. 
A key assumption of the PSM is that there are no omitted variables in the selection 
function, which is known as un-confoundedness. However, practically, it is impossible 
to control for all the relevant variables, and there is no straightforward method to test 
the validity of this assumption (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). As an alternative, the 
sensitivity of the results from different model specifications should be tested. 
Following Abate et al. (2016), we re-estimate the impacts of participation in 
decision-making processes using a reduced model specification of the selection 
function by dropping several important variables. The results from the reduced model 
are compared with the original model and serve as a sensitivity test. 
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Note that the villages included in this study may be structurally different from each 
other. Such differences may affect the governance of land cooperatives and create 
differences in the tendency of households’ participation in decision-making processes 
between villages. For example, in some villages more households may participate in 
decision-making processes, while in other villages, only a few households may 
participate. As a result, error terms may not be independent from the village, and we 
thus use standard errors clustered at the village level (Mazunda and Shively, 2015). 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4.3 shows descriptive statistics for the sampled households, disaggregated by 
their participation status. There are a number of statistically significant differences. For 
instance, household heads who participate in VOTE are younger and more educated. 
The households also have a lower dependency ratio and more assets, and they are more 
likely to live in Suzhou and to have a communist party member in their family. We find 
similar differences for participation in INFORMATION. Low variance inflation factors 
indicate that there is no problem with multicollinearity. 
Our outcome variable of interest is the land income per mu (hereafter land income) 
received from the land cooperative, which can more easily be compared between 
villages due to larger differences in the absolutes figure of land endowments (Yadav et 
al., 2015). Table 4.4 shows the land income received by the sampled households from 
the land cooperatives. On average, households who participate in both VOTE and 
INFORMATION receive the largest land income. Households who participate in either 
VOTE or INFORMATION receive a smaller land income. Those who do not 
participate receive the lowest income. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show that there are 
systematic differences between participants who differ in their co-management 
activities. We therefore need to address the self-selection by using PSM to arrive at 
unbiased estimates of the treatment effect. 
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Table 4.3 Sample Mean and Comparisons for Selected Independent Variables 
Variables 
VOTE   INFORMATION  
Yes No Difference  Yes No Difference 
Age 58.81 62.03 -3.22***  56.85 62.61 -5.76*** 
Male 0.95 0.95 0.00  0.96 0.95 0.01 
Education 8.45 6.87 1.59***  9.04 6.71 2.33*** 
Family size 4.05 3.89 0.16  3.98 3.92 0.06 
Dependency ratio 0.31 0.38 -0.06*  0.29 0.38 -0.10** 
Land area 4.10 4.10 -0.00  4.09 4.11 -0.01 
Asset 2.05 1.58 0.47***  2.00 1.61 0.39*** 
Party membership 0.59 0.28 0.31***  0.55 0.30 0.24*** 
Distance to town 6.41 6.22 0.19  6.26 6.28 -0.02 
Suzhou 0.93 0.78 0.15***  0.94 0.79 0.15*** 
Obs. 104 260   95 269  
Notes: Authors’ computation. Differences are tested by means of a two-sided unpaired t-test for the 
metric variables and a two-sided unpaired test of proportions for the binary variables; *** p<0.01; ** 
p<0.05; * p<0.10 
 
Table 4.4 Average Land Income per Mu 
Situations Obs. 
Land income per mu 
Mean S.D. 
VOTE = 1 (S1 and S2) 104 859.84 262.37 
VOTE = 0 (S3 and S4) 260 760.62 251.80 
INFORMATION = 1 (S1 and S3) 95 856.96 258.37 
INFORMATION = 0 (S2 and S4) 269 764.96 254.62 
VOTE = 1, INFORMATION = 1 (S1) 70 868.76 250.24 
VOTE = 1, INFORMATION = 0 (S2) 34 841.49 288.80 
VOTE = 0, INFORMATION = 1 (S3) 25 823.94 282.64 
VOTE = 0, INFORMATION = 0 (S4) 235 753.89 248.02 
Note: Authors’ computation. Mu is a Chinese unit of area, in which one mu equals 0.07 hectare 
 
4.4.2 Explaining Participation in Decision-making 
Table 4.5 presents estimates from a bivariate probit model explaining the determinants 
of households’ participation in co-management activities. We also report the results 
from a standard probit model in Table A 4- 1. The two models yield qualitatively 
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similar results. Because the covariance ρ of the error terms in the bivariate probit 
model is 0.776 and significantly different from zero, we should nonetheless use the 
estimates from the bivariate probit model. 
Table 4.5 Determinants of Participation in Decision-making 
Variables 
Bivariate probit model 
VOTE  INFORMATION 
Age - 0.010 (0.010)  - 0.022 ** (0.011) 
Male 0.557 * (0.313)  0.870 ** (0.430) 
Education 0.057 * (0.030)  0.100 *** (0.032) 
Family size - 0.095  (0.059)  - 0.103 * (0.058) 
Dependency ratio - 0.060  (0.282)  - 0.058 (0.347) 
Land area 0.006  (0.034)  0.017 (0.035) 
Asset 0.287 *** (0.074)  0.204 *** (0.077) 
Party membership 0.720 *** (0.141)  0.594 *** (0.160) 
Distance to town 0.016  (0.026)  0.012 (0.020) 
Suzhou 0.731 ** (0.285)  0.805 *** (0.304) 
Constant - 2.117 ** (0.906)  - 1.959 ** (0.862) 
Correlation coefficient 0.776 *** (0.066)    
Log likelihood - 315.98     
Number of observations 364     
Notes: Authors’ computation; The table reports coefficients; Standard error clustered at village level in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 
 
Households with older household heads are less likely to participate in either VOTE or 
INFORMATION activities. The impact of household heads’ age on INFORMATION is 
significant at the 5% level, consistent with an earlier finding that young members are 
more likely to participate in co-management activities (Rahut et al., 2015). However, 
its impact on VOTE is non-significant, suggesting that household heads’ age is not an 
important predictor for participating in VOTE. Male-headed households are more 
likely to participate in both decision-making activities, which is consistent with the 
study of Vargas et al. (2016), who find that females are less likely to speak up in group 
discussion in a co-management program in Colombia. 
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Household heads’ education shows a significant positive impact on participation. 
Educated community members are more likely to participate in co-management 
because effective participation critically depends on households’ capacity to express 
themselves and to access knowledge (Rao and Ibanez, 2005; Lestari et al., 2015). In 
addition, educated community members may be better in formulating community 
needs vis-à-vis external actors and in facilitating the implementation of participatory 
programs (Mansuri and Rao, 2012). 
A household’s assets and communist party membership positively impact participation 
in co-management, which is in line with previous findings (Vargas et al., 2016). Local 
elites, e.g., wealthier and politically connected households, often control the 
decision-making in co-management (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Mansuri and Rao, 
2012). Family size has a negative impact on participating in either VOTE or 
INFORMATION. The statistical significance is at the 10% or near the 10% level. This 
is in line with earlier findings from Prokopy and Thorsten (2008), who find that larger 
families are less likely to participate in co-management activities. One explanation 
could be that a larger family can better support the household’s livelihood if they 
engage in other sectors, and consequently, an income effect will discourage labor input 
in co-management activities (Uchida et al., 2009).  
4.4.3 Impact of Participation on Land Income 
We use here the propensity scores from the bivariate probit model presented earlier 
(Table 4.5). Table A 4- 2 in the appendix shows the number of treated households 
whose propensity scores falls within the scope (on-support) or beyond the scope 
(off-support) of the untreated households’ propensity scores for each of the five 
pair-wise comparisons. Figure A 4- 1 to Figure A 4- 5 show the distribution of 
pair-wise propensity scores between treated and untreated units. Given the skewed 
ratio in the number of observations of treated and untreated households, several 
untreated households are off-support, whereas only a few treated samples are 
off-support. It is therefore easy for the treated households to be matched with the 
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untreated households but more difficult for the opposite direction. In this situation, it is 
difficult to calculate the average treatment effect, but it is advised to use the average 
treatment effect on the treated (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Observations that are 
off-support (either treated or untreated) are not included in our computation of the 
impact. 
Table 4.6 reports the impact of participation in VOTE and INFORMATION on land 
income. Participation in either VOTE or INFORMATION shows significant and 
positive impacts on household income from the cooperative program. Households who 
participate in VOTE receive on average 856.54 RMB Yuan per mu from the 
cooperatives, which is approximately 100 RMB Yuan or 13% more than in the control 
group. Households who participate in INFORMATION receive on average 858.67 
RMB Yuan or 83.21 RMB Yuan more than in the control group. The increase of 
income from participation in INFORMATION is approximately 11%. 
Table 4.6 Impact of Participation in Co-management Activities on Land Income 
Decision-making 
Income 
(Treated) 
Income 
(Control) 
Absolute 
difference  
Relative 
difference 
S.E. T-statistic 
VOTE (S1 and S2 against S3 and 
S4) 
856.54 755.48 101.06 13% 30.72 3.290 *** 
INFORMATION (S1 and S3 
against S2 and S4) 
858.67 775.46 83.21 11% 32.65 2.548 ** 
Both VOTE and 
INFORMATION (S1 against S4) 
868.05 749.99 118.06 16% 36.75 3.212 *** 
Only VOTE (S2 against S4) 841.49 714.74 126.75 18% 49.08 2.582 *** 
Only INFORMATION (S3 
against S4) 
823.94 719.30 104.64 15% 66.07 1.584 † 
Notes: Authors’ computation; Matching algorism is nearest neighboring matching with three partners from 
control groups within common support; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; † p<0.15 
 
Table 4.6 also shows the joint and separate effects of participation in VOTE and 
INFORMATION. While the sizes of the effects are similar, the statistical significance 
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differs. Specifically, we find that households’ participation in both VOTE and 
INFORMATION increases land income by approximately 16%. Households’ 
participation solely in VOTE increases income by 18%. Households’ participation 
solely in INFORMATION increases income by 15%. Most differences between 
treatment and control groups are statistically significant at the 1% level. For 
INFORMATION, the estimates show wider confidence intervals, and the effect is, thus, 
less certain. 
4.4.4 Robustness Tests 
We conduct three additional analyses to test the robustness of our results. First, we 
separately re-estimate the impact of the five treatments with one or two matching 
partners from the control groups. An increase in the number of matching partners 
increases matching efficiency but may cause matching bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). The results (available from the authors upon request) show no qualitative 
change in the treatment effect but lead to a small decrease in the level of statistical 
significance due to the smaller number of observations.13 
Second, we assess to what extent the PSM estimators may be biased if the assumption 
of un-confoundedness does not hold. We estimate a reduced model specification of the 
selection function (cf. Abate et al., 2016). This model specification excludes two 
location variables, the distance to town and the city dummy, which omits important 
information and could, thus, bias the results. Estimation results are presented in Table 
A 4- 3 in the appendix. There are no qualitative differences in the treatment effects or 
                                                 
13 Our results remain qualitatively the same even with standard PSM. Tests on matching quality – such as covariate 
balancing, the value of R2, and the joint significance of variables before and after matching – all perform well. 
Sensitivity tests after kernel matching using standard PSM indicates that the critical values of hidden bias for the 
positive impacts which are statistically significant at 10% level (including VOTE, INFORMATION, both VOTE 
and INFORMATION, and only VOTE) fall in the ranges of 1.70-1.75, 1.25-1.30, 1.75-1.80, and 1.00-1.05, 
respectively. 
 95 
 
the level of statistical significance. 
Third, special attention should be paid to the estimates of joint and separate effects of 
participation in VOTE and INFORMATION due to the relatively small sample size of 
the households who participate in these activities. PSM was originally developed for 
treatment effects with large sample sizes (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). For small 
sample sizes, PSM may lead to biased estimates. An IPW approach has been widely 
used to address this problem, with a particular emphasis on small sample size (Gelo 
and Koch, 2014; Mazunda and Shively, 2015; Mishra and Sam, 2016).  
In IPW, the treatment variable is defined as having four different values (as shown in 
Table 4.1), with S1 = 3, S2 = 2, S3 = 1 and S4 = 0. By estimating a multinomial logit 
model with the reference category of situation four (S4), IPW calculates the propensity 
score but employs a propensity score weighting rather than the matching approach to 
evaluate the impact of multiple treatments. An important advantage of propensity score 
weighting is that it works better for small samples (Mazunda and Shively, 2015). We 
employ the IPW, using both the original set of variables and the reduced set of 
variables for re-estimation. Table 4.7 displays the results, which reproduce our earlier 
findings from Table 4.6. 
Table 4.7 Robustness Test from Inverse Probability Weighting Method 
Models Treatments ATT 
Robust 
S.E. 
Z-statistic 
Original 
model 
Both VOTE and INFORMATION (S1 against S4) 153.26 43.62 3.51 *** 
Only VOTE (S2 against S4) 93.03 46.93 1.98 ** 
Only INFORMATION (S3 against S4) 125.05 81.45 1.54 † 
Reduced 
model 
Both VOTE and INFORMATION (S1 against S4) 140.48 39.14 3.59 *** 
Only VOTE (S2 against S4) 96.35 46.27 2.08 ** 
Only INFORMATION (S3 against S4) 110.82 75.11 1.48 † 
Notes: Authors’ computation; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; † p < 0.15 
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4.5 Discussion 
We find that participation in either voting or obtaining financial information in land 
cooperatives has a positive impact on members’ land income, which is consistent with 
earlier findings showing that rent-seeking arises due to weak accountability and 
information asymmetries (Behera and Engel, 2006). Our findings support the notion 
that those in power will act in their own interest and realize an over-proportionate 
share of the benefits (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Prokopy, 2009; Kamoto et al., 2013). 
In other words, there is no benevolent rule (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Fritzen, 2007) 
in the land cooperative program. Some authors have also argued that people in power 
may trade favors in the co-management domain for increasing their political power in 
other domains (Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst, 2015). In the Chinese case, such links are 
less likely to exist, which may create a situation in which those who participate act 
more selfishly. 
While the evidence on the impact of participation in voting is strong, there is greater 
uncertainty regarding the impact of obtaining information. Obtaining information has a 
significant impact only if combined with voting. Part of this uncertainty is due to the 
small sample size. In addition, differences in access to benefits may be more likely to 
occur if program financial information is only known by people who are well 
connected to program leaders (Olken, 2007). For households who do not participate in 
voting, it could be harder to secure cooperative benefits even if they obtain financial 
information. As a result, these households may not succeed in increasing their benefit 
when bargaining with program leaders. 
4.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we assessed the impact of participating in decision-making in the land 
cooperative program in rural China using a bivariate probit model and the propensity 
score matching technique. We distinguish two types of decision-making – voting 
activities and receiving cooperatives’ financial information. We find that households’ 
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participation in decision-making is determined by household characteristics. In 
particular, wealthier households and households who have communist party members 
in the family are more likely to participate in both types of decision-making. Although 
land cooperatives are supposed to establish democratic and representative governance 
structures, the dominance of decision-making by wealthy and politically connected 
households casts doubt on the inclusiveness of land cooperatives’ governing bodies. 
The analysis on the impact of participation in decision-making reveals that 
participation in decision-making has a positive effect on households’ benefits from 
land cooperatives. Specifically, households who participate in either voting activities or 
receiving financial information in land cooperatives obtain more land income from 
cooperatives. The effect is particularly strong if households participate in both voting 
activities and receiving financial information. The effect is also significant if 
households participate in only voting activities, while the effect is uncertain if 
households participate in only receiving financial information. 
Our results have some important policy implications. The differences in land income 
between participants and non-participants in decision-making suggest that on the one 
hand, the accountability of decision-makers should be ensured to protect households 
who may not be able to participate from being exploited. On the other hand, a wide 
participation in decision-making processes should be encouraged. Specifically, the 
costs of participation should be as low as possible. Policy interventions should be 
applied so that major decision activities also include disadvantaged groups, such as the 
poor and those without political ties. In addition to booklets or posters, important 
financial information should be provided in a more convenient manner that, for 
example, allows easy access by members in their homes. 
In our study, land income is self-reported by households and refers to the official 
incomes received. There may be additional unreported income for those who control 
decision-making, and we may rather have underestimated the impact of participation in 
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decision-making. Because of the small sample size, a disaggregated analysis on the 
income received by different types of households is difficult. While it was our primary 
objective to assess the impact of decision-making on land income, future studies may 
also focus on investigating distributional aspects, such as differences between elite and 
non-elite households in the program. 
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5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Co-management of natural resources has long been on political agendas in countries 
such as South Africa, Malawi, India, Nepal and Philippines and China (Berkes, 2009; 
Njaya et al., 2012; Chhetri et al., 2013; Baynes et al., 2015). While the trend to 
co-management of natural resources is ongoing, empirical knowledge on the success 
factors and impacts of co-management programs remains limited. This has led to a 
knowledge gap about the impacts and mechanisms of co-management and insufficient 
knowledge for policy design. As a consequence, many natural resources 
co-management programs have failed to encourage the local population to participate, 
and many programs do not achieve their  objectives (Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Persha 
and Andersson, 2014). 
This thesis addressed this gap by analyzing success factors and impacts of a 
particularly prominent resource co-management program – the land cooperative 
program – in rural China. The aim was to investigate how local actors’ characteristics 
and contexts influence the success of the land cooperative program regarding three key 
dimensions: the inclusion of land, cooperative membership, and members’ 
participation in decision-making. Findings can improve our understanding of the land 
cooperative program, and several findings may also be transferred to shed light on 
other resource co-management programs. 
In the rest of this chapter, I first recapitulate and synthesize the key results and 
contribution of the empirical papers. Then, I point out the limitations of the thesis and 
present an outlook on further empirical work related to the land cooperative program. 
Finally, I develop policy recommendations. 
5.1 Key Results and Contributions 
5.1.1 Paper I: Cooperative Coverage and Local Elites 
Paper one considers the success of land cooperatives at the collective action level. It 
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addresses the question: which types of villages are suitable for the adoption of the 
program? To answer this question, the paper identifies different attributes of villages 
best suited for the adoption of the land cooperative program. Linear regression models 
and tobit regression models were employed. Several key findings are derived from this 
analysis. 
First, local institutions and policies matter. In particular, the proportion of land 
dedicated to cooperatives is larger if the town government assesses village leaders’ 
effort to promote cooperatives. In addition, the relative amount of land managed by 
cooperatives is higher in Suzhou. A plausible explanation is that Suzhou provides 
financial support to land cooperatives; whereas Yangzhou does not. This finding 
underpins results of Ito et al. (2016) who find that financial support has been an 
important factor for cooperative policy adoption in China.  
Second, village characteristics matter. Village market access (distance to town) shows a 
significant and positive effect on the proportion of land transferred to cooperatives. The 
closer to the town, the higher the value of land due to lower costs of transportation 
(Osabuohien, 2014). In addition, the amount of land in cooperatives is larger if more 
households in the village had off-farm employment, or if the average household 
landholding in the village was small. These results suggest that villages that were less 
dependent on agriculture were more likely to transfer land to cooperatives.  
Third, local elites play an important role in the development of land cooperatives. The 
amount of land in cooperatives is larger if local elites, such as government officials, 
village cadres or highly educated people, become cooperative leaders. These results for 
the first time provide quantitative evidence to support case study evidence on the 
positive role of local elites in the collective action for resource co-management 
(Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Balooni et al., 2010; Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst, 2015). 
The paper also demonstrates that during the life cycle of an organization, government 
officials are more effective as leaders in the early stages of the cooperative. 
Government officials have good access to policy information, and it is easier for them to 
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receive initial financial support from the local government. In contrast, if village cadres 
and educated people become cooperative leaders, there is a positive long-run impact 
thanks to their close ties with local households and their entrepreneurial orientation. 
5.1.2 Paper II: Cooperative Membership and Off-farm Employment 
Paper two considers the success of co-management at the level of cooperative 
membership. It focuses on two questions: a) which types of households are more likely 
to have cooperative membership?; b) does cooperative membership result in 
households’ labor reallocation? To answer the two questions, the paper identifies factors 
which affect households’ membership decision. A control function approach was 
employed to identify the causal effect of cooperative membership on household heads’ 
current off-farm employment. Several key findings are derived from the analysis. 
First, household heads’ off-farm experience before cooperative initiation in the village 
positively affects households’ cooperative membership, although the effect is small for 
households with many agricultural laborers. Households with more land are also more 
likely to participate in land cooperatives. These results are consistent with the literature 
on land markets which finds that households with off-farm employment and higher 
land endowments are more likely to transfer land (Yao, 2000; Rahman, 2010; Huang et 
al., 2012). 
Second, when households had little agricultural labor before cooperative initiation, 
their decision of cooperative membership is affected by the average number of land 
plots per household in the village and cooperative leadership. Specifically, when the 
land is highly fragmented or cooperative leadership is occupied by village leaders, 
households are more likely to participate in cooperatives. These results imply that 
cooperative membership of households which had little agricultural labor is driven by 
village level factors. 
Third, although the land cooperative program aims to release agricultural labor, there is 
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no evidence of a positive effect of cooperative membership on household heads’ 
current off-farm employment. However, cooperative membership increases household 
heads’ off-farm employment if households already had many agricultural laborers prior 
to program initiation. Further evidence suggests that such positive effects are only 
valid for household heads without off-farm employment experience. 
5.1.3 Paper III: Decision-making and Access to Benefit 
Paper three considers the success of co-management at the decision-making level. It 
addresses two questions: a) which types of cooperative members are more likely to 
participate in decision-making in land cooperatives?; b) does the participation in 
decision-making affects members’ access to benefits from cooperatives? To answer the 
first question, the paper identifies the factors which affect the participation in two levels 
of engagement – voting activities and obtaining financial information – in cooperative 
decision-making. To answer the second question, the paper employs a novel matching 
technique to compare the income from cooperatives between members who have 
participated in decision-making and those who have not. Several key findings are 
derived from this analysis.  
First, households with male or more educated household heads are in general more 
likely to participate in the two decision-making processes. Household heads’ age is an 
important predictor for seeking information. Households who are rich or have 
communist party membership are also more likely to participate in either type of 
decision-making, which is consistent with earlier findings that wealthy and politically 
well-connected households, often control the decision-making in co-management 
(Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Mansuri and Rao, 2012). Larger families tend to stay away 
from participation because they can better support households’ livelihoods if they 
engage in off-farm sectors, which is common in rural China. Consequently, an income 
effect will discourage labor input in co-management activities (Uchida et al., 2009). 
Second, households’ participation in either voting activities or obtaining financial 
information leads to a significant increase in land income received from cooperatives. 
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There is also a strong joint effect of participating in both types of decision-making. 
Approximately a 16% increase in resource income can be achieved if households 
participate in both, voting activities and obtaining financial information. Participation in 
voting activities can also increase households’ income from land cooperatives. 
However, the evidence on the effect of participation in obtaining financial information is 
relatively weak. 
5.1.4 Linking the Empirical Results 
In this section, I synthesize the results by comparing the findings from the three 
empirical papers. Such synthesis generates new insights regarding the success of the 
land cooperative program in China.  
The first insight is that the support of off-farm employment is a key concept in the 
implementation of the land cooperative program. As shown in paper one, cooperatives 
in villages which had more households engaging in off-farm activities before the start 
of the program receive more land. Consistent with paper one, paper two demonstrates 
that households headed by people who had off-farm employment before the start of the 
program are more likely to transfer land to cooperatives. In addition, in line with the 
objective of the program, land cooperatives increase the probability of household heads’ 
current off-farm employment if they had no off-farm employment before transferring 
land to the cooperative. These results suggest that the mobility of factors and 
well-developed labor markets are preconditions to implement the land cooperative 
program. 
The second insight is that local elites play a complex role in land cooperatives. 
Compared to non-elites, local elites are more likely to participate in and dominate 
decision-making in land cooperatives. On the one hand, the inclusion of local elites in 
decision-making can drive households’ participation, and consequently increase the 
amount of land dedicated to cooperatives thanks to their leadership ability and close 
ties with governments and households. On the other hand, households who participate 
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in decision-making often receive greater cooperative benefits than their less engaged 
counterparts, raising the concern of elite capture. The results of my thesis show that the 
involvement of local elites cannot only contribute to the expansion of land 
co-management and achieve the objective of land consolidation in rural China, but it 
may also undermine good governance in land cooperatives. 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
There are some limitations arising from the data used in the thesis. First, the household 
data were collected based on the random walk technique, because a random selection of 
households could not be achieved. Randomly selected households were often hard to 
reach because family members could be working beyond the village. Moreover, village 
leaders might have asked some pro-policy villagers to replace the randomly selected 
households due to the sensitivity of the topic. Thus, the random walk technique was used 
as an alternative, although it might introduce a selection bias.14 
Second, most household information was self-reported by the respondents rather than 
officially documented. While a systemic tendency may not occur in the neutral 
information (e.g. family size, land area and so on), it may occur if sensitive information 
is concerned, such as benefits from land cooperatives, especially when some of these 
benefit are illegal.15 As a result, the effect of participation in decision-making would be 
underestimated, yet, the general inferences of the thesis would not be affected. 
Third, the use of a structured questionnaire and a quantitative analysis often ignores 
much information to save cost. As a result, an in-depth understanding of households’ 
participation in land cooperatives is restrained. For example, many household 
                                                 
14 For example, because villagers with off-farm work were less likely to be surveyed due to absence from home, the 
effect of co-management membership on off-farm employment might be underestimated. 
15 For example, corrupt members who were in power in the land cooperative program may underreport the real land 
income distributed from the program. 
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characteristics did not exert a significant effect. Although this is partly due to the 
opposing effects of household characteristics in heterogeneous observations, the 
possibility that a lack of autonomy in households’ participation could in principal drive 
some of the results. If the lack of autonomy would be large, land cooperatives might 
exhibit even a negative net effect on households’ welfare. Future research may, thus, 
employ qualitative analysis to investigate the motivation of households’ participation 
in land cooperatives. 
5.3 Policy Recommendations 
The thesis reveals that the success of resource co-management programs may be 
influenced by the local context of villages. Policy makers in China should realize that 
not all villages are suitable for the land cooperative program. Despite the land 
cooperative program’s ability to address land fragmentation, a “one-size-fits-all” policy 
should be avoided. Villages which have less agricultural land and more households 
working off-farm – and which consequently depend less on agriculture – should be 
primarily targeted to develop land cooperatives. Villages close to the town center, on the 
contrary, have higher land values and should not be targeted due to the high costs to pay 
households. 
Policy makers should also re-consider the use of financial or political instruments to 
promote households’ participation in the land cooperative program. On the one hand, the 
evaluation on village leaders’ performance in the development of the land cooperative 
program, for example, can significantly improve the inclusiveness of the land 
cooperative program. On the other hand, such policy instruments may create strong 
incentives for local elites to exert negative power on households’ participation in the 
program. Ensuring households’ voluntary participation in the implementation of the 
program is a key, especially for households that do not have access to alternative 
livelihood sources, such as off-farm employment. 
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Policy makers should pay attention to the development of off-farm labor markets. 
Mobility of workers and a well-developed labor market are preconditions for 
households’ participation in land cooperatives and a guarantee for securing households’ 
livelihoods if they participate. Policy instruments should focus on improving 
households’ access to off-farm employment. In particular, policies should also secure 
the livelihood of older farmers, because they face greater challenges in finding off-farm 
employment after transferring land out. 
The role of local elites should be carefully considered in policy design. From the 
perspective of policy implementation, local elites should not be excluded from the 
cooperative leadership because they can effectively implement the policy and 
consolidate fragmented farmland. However, their power in decision-making should be 
restricted, especially when decision-making is about benefit distribution. To balance 
the elites’ power, more members from the non-elite households, e.g., the poor and those 
without social networks, should be encouraged to participate in decision-making. The 
importance of transparency in decision making, functional assembly meetings and 
control boards representing member interest and accountability in the governance of 
land cooperatives should be highlighted.  
The current rules on benefit distribution can generally be described as a black box. In the 
future, more transparent rules on benefit distribution should be designed. Members’ 
access to the cooperatives’ financial information should be provided in an inexpensive 
form. For example, rather than reporting such information in the way of posters or 
booklets, information should be accessible by members at home so that they can track 
the financial situation of the organization more easily. 
The land cooperative program is one of the most influential land reforms in China for 
the last decade. It addresses the issue of imperfect local factor markets commonly 
known also in most other transition economies, i.e., South America and 
Post-Communist Europe. It stands out from the recent land reform efforts in those 
countries by targeting mobility of labor, land consolidation, and a participatory 
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governance of land resources. In rural China much has been achieved in this regard, but 
much remains to be done. Results of this research contribute to the explanation of what 
has worked where and why as well as to informing necessary amendments in China’s 
land policy in the future.  
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Appendix 1: Supplementary Tables to “Community-based Agricultural 
Land Consolidation and Local Elites: Survey Evidence from China”  
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Table A 2- 1 Results from Tobit Models 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dist_town 2.499*** 2.481*** 2.465*** 2.153*** 2.107*** 
 
(0.744) (0.744) (0.746) (0.667) (0.659) 
Off_farm 0.323** 0.317** 0.323** 0.267* 0.265* 
 
(0.145) (0.146) (0.143) (0.143) (0.141) 
Landholding -5.798*** -5.694*** -5.769*** -5.361** -5.284** 
 
(2.049) (2.076) (2.012) (2.047) (2.032) 
Plot_no. 4.013 4.123 4.037 4.161 4.240 
 
(2.883) (2.848) (2.873) (2.829) (2.795) 
Evaluation 23.528** 23.281** 23.278** 22.172** 21.790** 
 
(9.455) (9.555) (9.376) (9.111) (9.111) 
Duration -2.607 -2.532 -2.498 -3.106 -2.958 
 
(2.189) (2.214) (2.161) (2.153) (2.160) 
Suzhou 46.960*** 45.621*** 46.222*** 47.800*** 46.420*** 
 
(10.918) (11.281) (10.792) (10.909) (11.162) 
Education 
 
3.613 
  
1.584 
  
(8.079) 
  
(8.027) 
Official_vill 
  
6.976 
 
7.571 
   
(9.493) 
 
(9.485) 
Official_gov 
   
30.217** 30.225** 
    
(14.445) (14.327) 
Constant 14.514 12.893 8.117 18.545 10.885 
 
(17.875) (18.817) (19.639) (17.070) (19.613) 
1/sigma 36.133*** 36.058*** 36.000*** 35.350*** 35.170*** 
 
(3.068) (3.100) (3.097) (3.001) (3.037) 
F 15.744 13.940 13.974 14.052 11.395 
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.096 0.097 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
Source: Authors’ computations 
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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Table A 2- 2 OLS Regressions with Natural Log Transformations 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Ln_Distance 14.118*** 13.960*** 13.813*** 13.009*** 12.638*** 
 
(3.948) (3.939) (3.955) (3.913) (3.822) 
Ln_Off_farm 9.299*** 9.002*** 9.513*** 8.267*** 8.346*** 
 
(2.747) (2.781) (2.749) (2.685) (2.670) 
Ln_Landholding -11.770** -11.395** -11.869** -12.150** -12.062** 
 
(5.090) (5.182) (5.116) (5.014) (5.135) 
Ln_Plot.no. 2.621 3.063 2.748 3.222 3.559 
 
(5.421) (5.243) (5.482) (5.315) (5.251) 
Evaluation 15.285** 15.113** 15.011** 15.072** 14.716** 
 
(7.085) (7.141) (6.964) (6.821) (6.790) 
Suzhou 37.345*** 35.904*** 36.220*** 35.954*** 34.140*** 
 
(7.443) (7.857) (7.522) (7.364) (7.811) 
Duration -2.452 -2.348 -2.295 -2.619* -2.410 
 
(1.542) (1.581) (1.520) (1.465) (1.487) 
Education 
 
3.948 
  
1.929 
  
(5.921) 
  
(5.921) 
Official_vill 
  
9.118 
 
9.099 
   
(7.720) 
 
(7.704) 
Official_gov 
   
21.640*** 21.440*** 
    
(6.895) (6.791) 
Constant -8.811 -9.803 -17.559 -3.096 -12.363 
 
(17.338) (18.044) (18.433) (16.794) (18.339) 
F 30.339 26.230 26.634 26.550 20.990 
Adjusted R2 0.477 0.475 0.478 0.498 0.495 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
Source: Authors’ computations 
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. The top 
four variables are log transformed. For variables with a value of zero, log transformations were 
calculated as the value of the variables plus 1. 
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Table A 2- 3 OLS Regression Based on A Sample without Extreme Values 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dist_town 1.719*** 1.712*** 1.752*** 1.475** 1.507*** 
 
(0.597) (0.599) (0.589) (0.558) (0.543) 
Off_farm 0.261** 0.261** 0.277** 0.201* 0.217* 
 
(0.117) (0.119) (0.114) (0.116) (0.116) 
Landholding -3.702** -3.613* -3.516** -3.521* -3.329* 
 
(1.836) (1.850) (1.727) (1.827) (1.740) 
Plot_no. 1.919 1.987 1.222 3.402 2.720 
 
(3.232) (3.253) (3.366) (2.936) (3.107) 
Evaluation 26.416*** 26.391*** 26.576*** 25.508*** 25.667*** 
 
(7.986) (8.007) (7.572) (7.873) (7.555) 
Suzhou 27.260** 26.259* 27.214** 25.702** 25.542* 
 
(13.333) (13.635) (13.285) (12.608) (13.023) 
Duration -5.399*** -5.335*** -5.129*** -5.463*** -5.190*** 
 
(1.680) (1.750) (1.660) (1.651) (1.683) 
Education 
 
2.167 
  
0.266 
  
(7.509) 
  
(7.603) 
Official_vill 
  
11.074 
 
10.826 
   
(9.845) 
 
(10.343) 
Official_gov 
   
25.330** 25.188** 
    
(10.852) (9.865) 
Constant 33.237** 31.822* 22.188 32.987** 22.013 
 
(16.044) (17.211) (17.976) (16.057) (18.776) 
F 12.736 11.071 10.963 13.626 10.835 
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.379 0.390 0.416 0.409 
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 
Source: Authors’ computations; Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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Appendix 2: Supplementary Tables to “Can Land Transfer through Land 
Cooperatives Foster Off-farm Employment in China” 
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Table A 3- 1 Estimation from Bivariate Probit Model (Full Sample) 
Variables Membership Off-farm 
Membership 
  
0.608 (0.422) 
Household head age 0.000 (0.009) -0.046*** (0.010) 
Male household head -0.172 (0.420) 0.797 (0.563) 
Household head education 0.032 (0.024) 0.001 (0.020) 
Household head off-farm experience 0.300** (0.150) 1.654*** (0.182) 
Land area per adult 0.398*** (0.145) 0.035 (0.105) 
Number of land plots 0.101 (0.092) 0.051 (0.064) 
Family size 0.070 (0.068) 0.076 (0.054) 
Dependency ratio -0.049 (0.272) -0.229 (0.275) 
Asset level -0.009 (0.100) 0.077 (0.073) 
Party membership 0.261 (0.168) 0.350** (0.156) 
Labor network -0.031 (0.097) -0.069 (0.102) 
Distance to town 0.016 (0.011) 0.008 (0.017) 
Suzhou 0.591*** (0.212) 0.263 (0.290) 
Average household landholding -0.019 (0.039) 
  
Average plot number per household 0.013 (0.044) 
  
Time since cooperative initiation 0.000 (0.024) 
  
Village cadre as cooperative leader 0.246* (0.146) 
  
Group average of participation 2.670*** (0.283) 
  
Constant -2.903*** (0.872) 0.307 (0.915) 
ρ -0.267 (-0.297) 
  
Observations 545 
   
Note: 
a. Coefficients are reported in the table. Clustered standard errors are in the parentheses 
b. The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate a significance level 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table A 3- 2 Estimation from Bivariate Probit Model (Subgroup Sample) 
Variables 
Unconstrained  Constrained 
Membership 
 
Off-farm 
  
Membership 
 
Off-farm 
 
Membership 
  
0.169 (0.439) 
   
1.020*** (0.362) 
Household head age 0.020 (0.014) -0.072*** (0.020) 
 
-0.013 (0.012) -0.041*** (0.014) 
Male household head -0.313 (0.554) 1.330** (0.623) 
 
-0.238 (0.564) 0.525 (0.727) 
Household head education 0.035 (0.038) 0.015 (0.036) 
 
0.028 (0.031) -0.018 (0.030) 
Household head off-farm experience 0.854** (0.369) 1.502*** (0.398) 
 
0.099 (0.222) 1.897*** (0.263) 
Land area per adult 0.379 (0.236) -0.117 (0.163) 
 
0.563*** (0.217) 0.054 (0.124) 
Number of land plots 0.139 (0.136) 0.031 (0.094) 
 
0.075 (0.107) 0.082 (0.087) 
Family size -0.061 (0.096) -0.009 (0.085) 
 
0.169** (0.075) 0.052 (0.075) 
Dependency ratio 0.169 (0.324) -0.311 (0.418) 
 
-0.285 (0.417) 0.336 (0.491) 
Asset level 0.194 (0.202) -0.123 (0.176) 
 
-0.085 (0.129) 0.230* (0.122) 
Party membership -0.119 (0.296) 0.663*** (0.248) 
 
0.405** (0.205) 0.187 (0.195) 
Distance to town -0.025 (0.020) 0.045* (0.027) 
 
0.026* (0.014) -0.017 (0.016) 
Suzhou 0.715 (0.461) 0.533* (0.302) 
 
0.715* (0.373) -0.079 (0.317) 
Average household landholding 0.134 (0.089) 
   
-0.074 (0.057) 
  
Average plot number per household 0.186** (0.085) 
   
-0.098 (0.089) 
  
Time since cooperative initiation 0.057 (0.066) 
   
-0.002 (0.035) 
  
Village cadre as cooperative leader 0.687** (0.319) 
   
0.135 (0.213) 
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Group average of participation 2.775*** (0.511) 
   
3.002*** (0.446) 
  
Constant -5.857*** (1.676) 2.062 (1.486) 
 
-2.023 (1.257) 0.019 (1.068) 
ρ 0.215 (0.287) 
   
-0.595* (0.253) 
  
Observations 248 
    
297 
   
Note: 
a. Households with one or no agricultural laborer before the start of the cooperative fall into the unconstrained group. Otherwise, they fall into the constrained group. 
b. Coefficients are reported in the table. Clustered standard errors are in the parentheses. 
c. The asterisks *, ** and *** indicate a significance level 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix 3: Supplementary Tables to “Does It Pay to Participate in 
Decision-making? Survey Evidence from Land Co-management in Jiangsu 
Province, China”  
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Table A 4- 1 Determinants of Participation in Decision-making 
Variables 
Standard probit model 
VOTE  INFORMATION 
Age - 0.009 (0.010)  - 0.020 * (0.011) 
Male 0.530 * (0.300)  0.742 * (0.416) 
Education 0.058 ** (0.029)  0.098 *** (0.031) 
Family size - 0.083  (0.058)  - 0.101 * (0.057) 
Dependency ratio - 0.071  (0.291)  - 0.106 (0.344) 
Land area 0.008  (0.033)  0.020 (0.035) 
Asset 0.269 *** (0.070)  0.207 *** (0.075) 
Party membership 0.709 *** (0.142)  0.574 *** (0.160) 
Distance to town 0.017  (0.026)  0.013 (0.021) 
Suzhou 0.688 ** (0.286)  0.715 ** (0.301) 
Constant - 2.129 ** (0.912)  - 1.866 ** (0.862) 
Log likelihood - 185.26   - 172.38  
Pseudo R2 0.149    0.175  
Number of observations 364    364  
Source: Authors’ computation; standard error clustered at village level in parentheses 
Note: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 
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Table A 4- 2 The Number of Treated Households on(off)-support 
 VOTE INFORMATION 
Both VOTE and 
INFORMATION 
Only 
VOTE 
Only 
INFORMATION 
On-support 99 90 65 34 25 
Off-support 5 5 5 0 0 
Notes: Authors’ computation; a treated household is on-support when its propensity score falls within 
the scope of the propensity scores of all the untreated households. Otherwise, it is off-support.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 4- 3 Impacts Using PSM from Reduced Bivariate Probit Model 
Decision-making Treated Control 
Absolute 
difference  
Relative 
difference 
S.E. T- statistic 
VOTE 859.90 761.18 98.73 13% 28.57 3.46 *** 
INFORMATION 858.67 762.10 96.57 13% 32.88 2.94 *** 
Both VOTE and 
INFORMATION 
872.24 766.56 105.67 14% 39.26 2.69 *** 
Only VOTE 841.49 730.11 111.38 15% 50.17 2.22 ** 
Only INFORMATION 823.94 715.87 108.07 15% 59.11 1.83 * 
Notes: Authors’ calculations; Matching algorism is nearest neighboring matching with three partners 
from control groups within common support; *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 
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Figure A 4- 1 Distribution of Pair-wise Propensity Scores (𝑃𝑃�1,2|1,2,3,4) 
 
 
Figure A 4- 2 Distribution of Pair-wise Propensity Scores (𝑃𝑃�1,3|1,2,3,4) 
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Figure A 4- 3 Distribution of Pair-wise Propensity Scores (𝑃𝑃�1|1,4) 
 
 
Figure A 4- 4 Distribution of Pair-wise Propensity Scores (𝑃𝑃�2|2,4) 
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Figure A 4- 5 Distribution of Pair-wise Propensity Scores (𝑃𝑃�3|3,4) 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaires 
 
This is part of the full version of the questionnaire. It covers the major questions to 
obtain information used in the thesis. The full version of questionnaire is not presented 
here and serves for other research projects led by Professor Shuyi Feng from Nanjing 
Agricultural University. 
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Questions in the Village and Cooperative Questionnaire 
General Information about the Questionnaire   
 Questionnaire Code:   
 Location of Survey:   
 Survey Date:   
 Interviewer:   
 Consistency checker:   
    
Section 1: Information about the Village   
1. Your name:   
2. Your position in the village committee:   
3. Your phone number:   
4. What is the officially registered name of the land 
cooperative?   
5. When was the cooperative initiated?   
6. How far is it from the village committee to the 
location of the city government?   
7. How far is it from the village committee to the 
location of the county government?   
8. How far is it from the village committee to the 
location of the town government?   
9. How many farmlands are there in the village?   
10. On average, how many plots did every household own 
before the initiation of the land cooperative program?   
11. How much percentage of households in the village   
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purely worked in off-farm sector before the initiation 
of the land cooperative program? 
12. How much percentage of households in the village 
purely worked in farm sector before the initiation of 
the land cooperative program?   
13. How much percentage of households in the village 
worked in both off-farm and farm sector before the 
initiation of the land cooperative program?   
14. How many households have transferred their land to 
the land cooperative?   
15. In total, how much land in the village has been 
transferred to the land cooperative?   
16.. Is the scale of the land cooperatives related to the 
political evaluation of the rural cadres?   
   
Section 2: Information about the Cooperative Director   
17. What is the name of the land cooperative director?   
18. Is the cooperative director male of female?  Male ; Female  
19. What is the age of the cooperative director?   
20. How many years of education does the director have?   
21. Is the cooperative director a communist party 
member?  Yes  ; No     
22. Has the cooperative director ever been a government 
official?  Yes  ; No     
23. Has the cooperative director ever been a village 
cadre?  Yes  ; No     
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24. Has the cooperative director ever been an 
entrepreneur?  Yes  ; No     
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Questions in the Household Questionnaire 
General Information about the Questionnaire   
 Questionnaire Code:   
 Location of Survey:   
 Survey Date:   
 Interviewer:   
 Consistency checker:   
    
Section 1: Information about Individual Farmer   
1. The first family member’s information   
 Relationship with the household head  Household head 
 Age   
 Gender  Male ; Female  
 Years of education   
 A communist party member?  Yes  ; No     
 A government official?  Yes  ; No     
 A village cadre?  Yes  ; No     
 Had non-agricultural experience before 20__(Please 
refer to the time of program initiation in the village 
level questionnaire) 
 
Yes  ; No     
 Has an agricultural employment in 2013?  Yes  ; No     
 If yes, what is the income in 2013?   
 Has a non-agricultural employment in 2013?  Yes  ; No     
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   If yes, what is the income in 2013?   
2. The second family member’s information   
 Relationship with the household head   
Questions from 1.1 to 1.9 repeat until all the family 
members’ information is obtained. 
 
    
Section 2: Information about Land Endowment   
3. Land Plot   
 Area of plot number 1   
 Area of plot number 2   
 … …   
Question repeats until all the plots’ information is 
obtained. 
 
    
Section 3: Information about Participation in Land Cooperative 
4. Have you transferred land to (participated in) the land 
cooperative in the village? 
 
Yes  ; No     
5. If the answer for the above question is yes, then how 
much land has your family transferred to the land 
cooperative? 
  
6. How many shares does your family have in the land 
cooperative? 
  
7. In 2013, how much money has your family received 
from the land cooperative? 
  
 among which, fixed income is    
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 dividend income is    
 income from government subsidy is    
8. Has any of your family members ever participated in 
devising or revising cooperative regulation? 
 
Yes  ; No     
9. Has any of your family members ever participated in 
voting activities, e.g. the selection of cooperative 
representatives or cooperative administrative staff? 
 
Yes  ; No     
10 Is it possible for the members to access the 
cooperative’s financial information? 
 
Yes  ; No     
 If yes, how?   
11. Do you know the yearly cost and benefit of the land 
cooperative? 
 
Yes  ; No     
    
Section 4: Information about Households’ Major Assets 
12 How many houses does your family have?   
 When did you buy or build the first house?   
 What was the price or cost?   
 When did you buy or build the second house?   
 What was the price or cost?   
 … …   
13 How many cars and trucks does your family have?   
 When did you buy the first one?   
 What was the price or cost?   
 When did you buy the second one?   
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 What was the price or cost?   
 … …   
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